Early impacts of the European social fund 2007-13 by Ainsworth, Paul & Marlow, Simon
 In-House Research  
Early Impacts of the European 
Social Fund 2007-13 
by Paul Ainsworth and Simon Marlow   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department for Work and Pensions 
 
 
In-House Research No 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early Impacts of the 
European Social Fund 
2007-13 
 
Paul Ainsworth and Simon Marlow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A report of research carried out by the Department for Work and Pensions 
 
 
 
© Crown copyright 2011. 
 
You may re-use this information (not including logos) free of charge in any 
format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. 
 
To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-
government-licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The National 
Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk. 
 
This document/publication is also available on our website at: 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/ihs-index.asp 
 
 
Any enquiries regarding this document/publication should be sent to us at: 
 
Department for Work and Pensions, Commercial Support and Knowledge 
Management Team, Work and Welfare Central Analysis Division, Upper 
Ground Floor, Steel City House, West Street, Sheffield S1 2GQ 
 
First Published 2011 
 
ISBN 978-1-84947-615-7  
 
 
Views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Department for 
Work and Pensions or any other Government Department. 
 
 
Contents 
SUMMARY ......................................................................................................1 
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................6 
1.1 Rationale for analysis ................................................................................................ 6 
1.2 Introduction to the European Social Fund............................................................... 8 
1.2.1 Funding and Management of the ESF Programme ................................................. 8 
1.2.2 DWP ESF funded employment provision................................................................. 9 
1.2.3 Participation on the Current Programme................................................................ 11 
1.2.4 Performance variation across contracts................................................................. 12 
2 DATA AND SAMPLE DEFINITION........................................................14 
2.1 Sample definition...................................................................................................... 14 
2.1.1 Defining the ESF participant samples .................................................................... 15 
2.1.2 Defining the non-participant samples..................................................................... 15 
2.2 Data sources and variables ..................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Description of Variables ......................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Data quality issues ................................................................................................. 19 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................... 20 
2.3.1 JSA customers: comparing ESF participants with non-participants ...................... 21 
2.3.2 IB/ESA customers: comparing ESF participants with non-participants ................. 22 
2.3.3 Comparing the JSA and IB/ESA non-participant samples..................................... 23 
2.4 Comparing benefit rates of participants and non-participants ........................... 23 
3 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................25 
3.1 Conditional Independence Assumption................................................................. 25 
3.1.1 Controlling for selection bias .................................................................................. 25 
3.2 Propensity Score Matching ..................................................................................... 27 
3.2.1 Common Support for Participants .......................................................................... 28 
3.2.2 Matching Quality..................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Measuring Outcomes and Impacts......................................................................... 32 
3.4 Sensitivity to methods ............................................................................................. 33 
4 RESULTS...............................................................................................34 
4.1 Primary Estimates for JSA and IB/ESA groups..................................................... 34 
4.1.1 Net impacts on the JSA customer group................................................................ 35 
4.1.2 Net impacts on the IB/ESA customer group .......................................................... 36 
 i
4.2 Discussion of Primary Estimates............................................................................ 36 
4.3 Sub-Group and Sub-Treatment analysis................................................................ 38 
4.3.1 Rationale for selected sub-group categories ......................................................... 40 
4.3.2 Rationale for selected sub-treatment categories ................................................... 42 
4.3.3 Results of the Sub-group and Sub-treatment analysis .......................................... 44 
5 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................49 
Appendix 1 - Controlling for Labour Market History.......................................................... 52 
Appendix 2 – Generating Pseudo Start Dates .................................................................... 54 
Appendix 3 – Matching Protocol.......................................................................................... 56 
Appendix 4 - Propensity Score Distribution for primary IB and ESA group:.................. 57 
Appendix 5 - Mutually exclusive outcomes and impacts.................................................. 58 
Appendix 6 - Sensitivity to methods.................................................................................... 59 
Sensitivity to time-based variables...................................................................................... 59 
Sensitivity to the method of generating pseudo starts ........................................................ 59 
Sensitivity to the Kernel bandwidth ..................................................................................... 60 
Sensitivity to the method of cleaning employment data...................................................... 61 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................63 
List of Figures  
Figure 1: Impact on likelihood of claiming main benefit (JSA group) ........................................ 4 
Figure 2: Impact on likelihood of claiming main benefit (IB/ESA group) ................................... 4 
Figure 3: Impact on likelihood of claiming any working age benefit (JSA group)...................... 4 
Figure 4: Impact on likelihood of claiming any working age benefit (IB/ESA group)................. 4 
Figure 5: Impact on likelihood of being in employment (JSA group)......................................... 4 
Figure 6: Impact on likelihood of being in employment (IB/ESA group).................................... 4 
Figure 1.1: Monthly inflows and cumulative participation on DWP ESF funded provision...... 11 
Figure 1.2: Contract Performance – Job entry rate by Benefit History.................................... 13 
Figure 2.1: JSA receipt rate among participants and non-participants ................................... 23 
Figure 2.2: IB/ESA receipt rate among participants and non-participants .............................. 23 
Figure 3.1: Primary JSA Analysis Propensity Score Distribution: ........................................... 28 
Figure 4.1: Impact on likelihood of claiming main benefit (JSA group) ................................... 34 
Figure 4.2: Impact on likelihood of claiming main benefit (IB/ESA group) .............................. 34 
Figure 4.3: Impact on likelihood of claiming any working age benefit (JSA group)................. 35 
Figure 4.4: Impact on likelihood of claiming any working age benefit (IB/ESA group)............ 35 
Figure 4.5: Impact on likelihood of being in employment (JSA group).................................... 35 
Figure 4.6: Impact on likelihood of being in employment (IB/ESA group)............................... 35 
Figure 5.1: Comparing two alternative controls for labour market history............................... 53 
Figure 5.2: Primary IB/ESA Analysis Propensity Score Distribution: ...................................... 57 
 
 ii
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Variables and values used in the analysis ............................................................. 17 
Table 2.2: Variables and values additionally used in analysis of IB/ESA recipients ............... 18 
Table 2.3: Characteristics of the JSA and IB/ESA primary samples....................................... 21 
Table 3.1: Specification statistics for the JSA group matching ............................................... 29 
Table 3.2: Specification statistics for the IB/ESA group matching .......................................... 29 
Table 3.3: Unmatched and matched means for primary JSA analysis ................................... 30 
Table 3.4: Unmatched and matched means for primary IB/ESA analysis .............................. 31 
Table 4.1: Sub-groups and Sub-treatments for analysis ......................................................... 39 
Table 4.2: Group categories for age, disability, ethnicity and gender ..................................... 42 
Table 4.3: Treatment by Unit Cost and Funding Model........................................................... 42 
Table 4.4: Sub-group Impacts ................................................................................................. 45 
Table 4.5: Sub-treatment Impacts ........................................................................................... 46 
Table 5.1: Illustrative example of the proportion and cumulative proportion of participants 
starting ESF provision by month.............................................................................................. 54 
Table 5.2: Illustrative example of the assignment of pseudo start dates to non-participants by 
month....................................................................................................................................... 55 
Table 5.3: Impacts (percentage points) on mutually exclusive outcomes at 26 weeks for JSA 
customers ................................................................................................................................ 58 
 
 iii
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Andrew Thomas and Mike Daly at the 
Department for Work and Pensions for their ongoing support and advice 
throughout the duration of this research.  
 
Special thanks also go to Alex Bryson and John Forth at the National Institute 
for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) for their expert guidance and 
thorough quality assurance of this work.  
 
We are also grateful to everyone at the Department for Work and Pensions 
who took the time read through the many drafts of this report; in particular 
Mike Daly, Andrew Thomas, Mike Jones, Ellenor Brooks, David Oatley, Nick 
Gilhooly, Chris Kent and Amanda Rowlatt. The feedback and comments we 
received have undoubtedly led to a more informative and methodologically 
robust evaluation than would otherwise have been possible. 
 
 iv
Abbreviations 
ATT Average effect of Treatment on the Treated 
CFO Co-financing Organisation 
CIA Conditional Independence Assumption 
DiD Difference-in-Differences 
DLA Disability Living Allowance 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
ESA Employment and Support Allowance 
ESF European Social Fund 
EU European Union  
EZ Employment Zones 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
IB Incapacity Benefit 
ILM Intermediate Labour Market 
IMD Index (or Indices) of Multiple Deprivation 
IS Income Support 
JCP Jobcentre Plus 
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance 
LMS Labour Market System 
LSC Learning and Skills Council 
NBD National Benefits Database 
ND50+ New Deal 50+ 
NDDP New Deal for Disabled People 
NDIF  New Deal Innovation Fund 
NDLP New Deal for Lone Parents 
NDLTU New Deal for Long Term Unemployed 
NDP New Deal for Partners 
NDYP New Deal for Young People 
NEET Not in Education, Employment or Training 
PSM Propensity Score Matching 
UK United Kingdom 
WBLA Work Based Learning for Adults 
WBLA (BET) Work Based Learning for Adults (Basic Employability Training) 
WBLA (LOT) Work Based Learning for Adults (Longer Occupation Training) 
WBLA (SJFT) Work Based Learning for Adults (Short Job-Focused Training) 
 v
 1
                                                
Summary 
The European Social Fund (ESF) was set up to improve employment 
opportunities in the European Union and so help raise standards of living. Its 
aim is to help people fulfil their potential by giving them better skills and better 
job prospects1. A key feature of ESF funding is that it must be used to 
purchase additional provision in order to extend coverage, address gaps and 
complement domestic funding. The provision itself is varied and flexible, 
including activities such as job search guidance, basic skills training, case 
worker support and advice on tackling specific barriers to work.  
This paper describes findings from an evaluation of the net impacts of the 
2007-13 European Social Fund (ESF) Programme for England. The study is 
focused on the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) ESF funded2 
employment provision part3 of the programme, which is contracted by DWP 
during 2008-11, and delivered by private, public and third sector providers at 
an expected cost of £265 million. Our analysis focuses on participants who 
entered the programme between June 2008 and April 2009 and estimates the 
programme impacts on two broad DWP customer groups: participants in 
receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and participants in receipt of Incapacity 
Benefit or Employment Support Allowance. 
The evaluation sample and measured outcomes 
Entry onto the DWP ESF employment programme is voluntary and is 
available to anyone who is not in employment. This broad eligibility leads to a 
greater heterogeneity of participant characteristics than might be expected for 
other DWP employment programmes where eligibility may be dependent on 
receipt of particular benefits and/or the duration of a benefit claim. 
 
For this reason, when performing our primary analysis we estimate impacts 
separately for two broad groups of participants: 
  
1. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) customers; and 
2. Incapacity Benefit (IB) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
customers. 
 
The JSA sample comprises 25,720 ESF participants who entered the 
programme between June 2008 and April 2009 and were receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance at the time of programme entry. 
 
The IB/ESA sample comprises 1,970 ESF participants who entered the 
 
1 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/esf/about-esf/ 
2 The ESF funded part of the programme uses money provided by the European Social Fund. 
The programme also includes an equivalent amount of ‘matched’ funding, which is provided 
by the Co-financing Organisations responsible for distributing the ESF funds. In this paper we 
concern ourselves only with the ESF funded part of the programme. 
3 This is defined by the ESF Programme as Priorities 1 and 4. 
programme between June 2008 and April 2009 and were receiving either 
Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance at the time of 
programme entry. 
 
Comparison groups of non-participants in receipt of JSA and IB/ESA are 
drawn from the population of individuals who could have entered the 
programme during the same time period as participants in the sample. Groups 
of non-participants are selected who most closely resemble ESF participants 
with regard to demographic characteristics, benefit and employment history 
and prior participation on DWP programmes.  
 
The matched groups of participants and non-participants are compared over 
time with regard to the proportion of the group who are: 
 
- In receipt of their main benefit (the benefit they were receiving on 
programme entry); 
 
- In receipt of any main working age DWP benefit (Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
Incapacity Benefit, Employment Support Allowance or Income Support); 
and 
 
- In employment. 
 
This comparison between matched groups provides estimates of the net 
impacts of DWP ESF employment support on the labour market prospects of 
those who participate (the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT). 
Impacts are estimated for 52 weeks following entry to the programme. 
Impacts of the Programme on JSA customers 
As shown in Figure 1, the impact of the programme on JSA receipt for the 
JSA customer group is positive (between +1 percentage point and +3 
percentage points) in each of the 52 weeks following participation, which 
suggests that participation slightly increases an individual’s chances of 
claiming JSA over this period. This effect is statistically significant4 for most 
of the 52 week period. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the impact of the programme on the receipt of any 
main working age benefit5 for this group is positive for the first 15 weeks 
after participation (between +1 percentage points and +3 percentage points), 
indicating that participation slightly increases an individual’s chances of 
claiming benefit over this period. Beyond 15 weeks after the start of 
participation the impact is not significantly different from zero. 
 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise specified, we report results as statistically significant if they are significant 
at the 5% level. 
5 In this paper, the rate of receipt of any main working age benefit is the proportion of the 
stated group receiving any of the following DWP benefits: Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income 
Support, Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance. 
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As shown in Figure 5, the impact of the programme on employment for this 
group is positive in each of the 52 weeks following participation, rising from 0 
percentage points to +4.5 percentage points towards the end of this period. 
This indicates that participation increases an individual’s chances of being 
in employment over this period. This effect increases over time and is 
statistically significant for almost all of the 52 week period. 
 
There is no contradiction in the finding that both the benefit and employment 
impact estimates are positive for the first 15 weeks following participation. 
This is because the impacts are not mutually exclusive and do not account for 
all possible outcomes. In Appendix 5 we show that the positive benefit and 
employment impacts are balanced by a negative impact on the labour market 
position ‘neither receiving benefit nor in employment’. 
Impacts of the Programme on IB/ESA customers 
As shown in Figure 2, the impact of the programme on IB/ESA receipt for 
the IB/ESA customer group is negative in each of the 52 weeks following 
participation (reaching a minimum of nearly -14 percentage points and then 
declining to -13 percentage points at 52 weeks), suggesting that participation 
substantially decreases an individual’s chances of claiming IB/ESA over 
this period. This effect is statistically significant for almost all of the 52 week 
period. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the impact of the programme on the receipt of any 
main working age benefit for this group is also negative in each of the 52 
weeks following participation (reaching a minimum of almost -11 percentage 
points and then declining to -9 percentage points at 52 weeks), suggesting 
that participation substantially decreases an individual’s chances of 
claiming benefit over this period. This effect is also statistically significant 
for most of the 52 week period. 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the impact of the programme on employment for this 
group is positive in each of the 52 weeks following participation (peaking at 
+12 percentage points and then declining to +11 percentage points at 52 
weeks), suggesting that participation substantially increases an individual’s 
chances of being in employment over this period. This effect is statistically 
significant for almost all of the 52 week period. 
 
In summary, ESF provision has low impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance 
recipients, but is far more effective for Incapacity Benefit and Employment 
Support Allowance recipients over the 52 weeks following participation. 
 
This paper additionally investigates whether the effectiveness of ESF support 
for JSA customers varies according to the demographic characteristics of 
participants or the type of support provided. Our findings show that the 
impacts of the programme are fairly homogeneous across the broad range of 
participant characteristics and across the range of support offered. 
 3
 
Figure 1: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming main benefit (JSA group) 
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Figure 3: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming any working age benefit 
(JSA group) 
Figure 4: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming any working age benefit 
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Figure 5: Impact on likelihood of 
being in employment (JSA group) 
Figure 6: Impact on likelihood of 
being in employment (IB/ESA 
group) 
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We propose a number of possible explanations for the findings reported in this 
paper: 
 
- The voluntary nature of ESF provision means that ESF participants are 
likely to be more ‘work-ready’ than non-participants. This is particularly the 
case among JSA customers who tend to be less disadvantaged and closer 
to the labour market than IB/ESA customers. It is therefore likely that many 
JSA customers participating on ESF could have achieved jobs without the 
additional support provided by ESF; 
 
- Incapacity Benefit customers (who make up the majority of the IB/ESA 
participant group) have a lower base-level of employment support and 
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tend to be further away from the labour market than JSA customers. This 
could explain why impacts the of ESF provision are larger for the IB/ESA 
group than the JSA group; 
 
- JSA customers tend to move away from benefit receipt quickly even 
without additional support. The short-term impacts for this group are 
negative, possibly because time spent on the programme leads to a 
reduction in job search activity (lock-in effect); 
 
- There may be softer outcomes of the programme, such as increased skills, 
which would not necessarily be observed in our current short term impact 
measures, but may improve labour market prospects in the long term. 
 
 
We note also three important caveats around the findings of this evaluation: 
 
- As is the case in all non-experimental programme evaluations we can 
never be absolutely certain that we have fully accounted for the potential 
bias arising from selection onto the programme. However, the 
methodology we use, as described in this paper, takes all reasonable 
steps to minimise this bias; 
 
- The evaluation considers only a part of the ESF programme: employment 
provision financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and provided 
through the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) between June 
2008 and April 2009. Findings of this evaluation should not be presumed 
to indicate the impacts of the entire 2007-2013 ESF programme. 
 
- The evaluation looks at net impacts in terms of benefit receipt and 
employment rates only. Other evaluations, such as the ESF Cohort Survey 
(Drever and Lloyd, 2010), have found positive effects that lie outside the 
scope of this analysis. For example, participants experience improved 
confidence and job readiness and many participants feel that the 
programme has helped them to gain basic skills and vocational 
qualifications. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper describes findings from an evaluation of the net impacts of the 
2007-13 European Social Fund (ESF) Programme for England. The study is 
focused on the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) ESF funded6 
employment provision part7 of the programme, which is contracted by DWP 
during 2008-11, and delivered by private, public and third sector providers at 
an expected cost of £265 million. Our analysis focuses on participants who 
entered the programme between June 2008 and April 2009 and estimates the 
programme impacts on two broad DWP customer groups: participants in 
receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and participants in receipt of 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA). 
1.1 Rationale for analysis 
Estimating the net impacts of an employment programme is vital to 
understanding its effectiveness in helping people to move away from benefit 
receipt and into employment. Impact estimates provide an objective measure 
of programme effectiveness, which allows policy makers to compare different 
employment programmes and inform policy decisions. 
As is the case when estimating the impacts of any voluntary employment 
programme, we face a fundamental evaluation problem. Many participants 
who receive support subsequently enter employment or move away from 
receipt of benefits, but we can never be certain whether this was directly due 
to the support they received. We can observe the labour market outcomes (in 
employment, receiving benefit etc.) of each participant after they participate in 
the programme, but we cannot observe the ‘counterfactual’ outcomes that 
would have happened if they had not entered the programme. To understand 
the direct impacts of the programme, we must therefore find a way to estimate 
these counterfactual outcomes. 
Most net impact evaluations of voluntary employment programmes rely on 
statistical techniques to construct a suitable comparison group of non-
participants who can best represent what would have happened to 
participants if they had not entered the programme. This relies on having a 
rich data set describing the characteristics of individual participants and non-
participants. In the past, such a data set has been unavailable for the ESF 
programme, but the recent availability of individual-level participant data has 
enabled us to construct a rich data set from a range of data sources. Using 
                                                 
6 The ESF funded part of the programme uses money provided by the European Social Fund. 
The programme also includes an equivalent amount of ‘matched’ funding, which is provided 
by the Co-financing Organisations responsible for distributing the ESF funds. In this paper we 
concern ourselves only with the ESF funded part of the programme. 
7 This is defined by the ESF Programme as Priorities 1 and 4. 
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this data we are able to construct treatment and comparison groups from 
which we can estimate the net impacts of the programme. 
Evaluation of the ESF programme is further complicated by the broad and 
flexible eligibility criteria and the wide variety of support offered to participants. 
To overcome some of the difficulties posed by this heterogeneity, we provide 
separate ‘primary’ impact estimates for two broadly defined DWP customer 
groups: participants in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and participants in 
receipt of Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance. We then 
perform ‘sub-group’ impact estimates to explore whether the programme 
impacts for Jobseeker’s Allowance customers vary according to the 
characteristics of participants and the type of support they receive, by 
comparing the impacts for a number of participant and support sub-groups 
with our primary impact estimates.  
This report makes an important step towards assessing the effectiveness of 
DWP employment provision funded by the ESF, which currently accounts for 
about a tenth of all DWP employment programme expenditure. It aims to fill 
some of the evidence gap around the impacts of the ESF programme, as 
proposed by the recent House of Lords Committee Report (2010). The report 
recommended that ‘…a robust methodolodgy for assessing effectiveness is 
key to the short and long term future of the European Social Fund. We 
conclude that there is substantial room for improvement’.  
Therefore, the study is useful for a number of reasons: 
 
- From a DWP perspective, for adding to the overall evidence base by 
estimating the impacts of a major employment programme, which has a 
distinctive quality of providing support across client groups;  
 
- It is the first time that an impact analysis of ESF has been performed in the 
UK; 
 
- It will be useful to the European Commission for providing a rare 
opportunity for assessing the effectiveness of the ESF relative to a 
comparison group8. It will feed into understanding the ‘value for money’ of 
the ESF, worth 76bn Euro across Europe in 2007-13, and inform the EU 
Budget Review for 2014-20; 
 
- The study is among the first employment evaluations of its kind since the 
onset of the recent recession. It is therefore of broader interest to a range 
of policy makers and contributes to the research literature; and 
 
- The study has a number of novel features in its use of data: in particular in 
its use of detailed benefit and work histories and the method of controlling 
for participation on other DWP employment programmes.  
                                                 
8 For details of other impact evaluations across EU Member States on the 2000-2006 
Programme, see the EC evaluation ‘Study on the Return on ESF Investment in Human 
Capital’ (2010). 
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We note also three important caveats around the findings of this evaluation: 
 
- As is the case in all non-experimental programme evaluations we can 
never be absolutely certain that we have fully accounted for the potential 
bias arising from selection onto the programme. However, the 
methodology we use, as described in this paper, takes all reasonable 
steps to minimise this bias; 
 
- The evaluation considers only a part of the ESF programme: employment 
provision financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and provided 
through the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) between June 
2008 and April 2009. Findings of this evaluation should not be presumed 
to indicate the impacts of the entire 2007-2013 ESF programme; and 
 
- The evaluation looks at net impacts in terms of benefit receipt and 
employment rates only. Other evaluations, such as the ESF Cohort Survey 
(Drever and Lloyd, 2010), have found positive effects that lie outside the 
scope of this analysis. For example, participants experience improved 
confidence and job readiness and many participants feel that the 
programme has helped them to gain basic skills and vocational 
qualifications. 
1.2 Introduction to the European Social Fund 
The European Social Fund (ESF) was set up to improve employment 
opportunities in the European Union and so help raise standards of living. Its 
aim is to help people fulfil their potential by giving them better skills and better 
job prospects. 9 A key feature of ESF funding is that it must be used to 
purchase additional provision in order to extend coverage, address gaps and 
complement domestic funding. The provision itself is varied and flexible, 
including activities such as job search guidance, basic skills training, case 
worker support and advice on tackling specific barriers to work.  
1.2.1 Funding and Management of the ESF Programme  
The current ESF programme for England runs from 2007-2013 and 
geographically covers England and Gibraltar. The total budget for the 
programme is £5 billion. This includes £2.5 billion of EU money provided by 
the European Social Fund, and £2.5 billion of national match funding provided 
by Co-financing Organisations (CFOs). The overall responsibility for the funds 
lies with the Managing Authority, which sits within the Department for Work 
                                                 
9 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/esf/about-esf/ 
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and Pensions and manages the programme at a national level. The Managing 
Authority delegated some functions to Government Offices10. 
At a regional level, the funds are distributed through Co-financing 
Organisations11 (CFOs). The Skills Funding Agency and the DWP are the two 
largest CFOs (responsible for about 87% of the total fund in England) and 
bring together ESF and domestic funding for employment and skills provision 
so that ESF complements domestic programmes. The CFOs contract, through 
open and competitive tendering, with organisations or ‘providers’ that deliver 
ESF projects on the ground.  
Of the £2.5 billion budget for the 2007-13 ESF funded part of the programme, 
£1.6 billion is allocated to Priorities 1 and 4 for helping people who are not in 
work to enter employment and for providing help to those aged 14-19 who are 
not in education, employment or training (NEETs), with a strong emphasis on 
tackling barriers faced by disadvantaged groups. Of the remaining Priorities, 
£0.9 billion is allocated to Priorities 2 and 5 to address the development of 
workforce skills, while Priorities 3 and 6 involve ‘technical assistance’ activities 
to support programme delivery. The present evaluation estimates the impacts 
of ESF support for participants who are not in employment when they enter 
the ESF programme. Impact estimates are therefore only for participants 
receiving support under Priorities 1 and 4.  
 
At the beginning of the programme the England ESF Managing Authority set a 
range of indicators and targets for measuring programme performance. For 
Priorities 1 and 4 these include the proportion of participants who enter 
employment after leaving the programme, and the proportion of participants 
who are (at the time of entry onto the programme):  
 
- unemployed; 
- economically inactive; 
- aged 14-19 and not in education, employment or training (NEET); 
- female; 
- disabled or have a health condition; 
- of an ethnic minority; 
- aged 50 years or above; 
- lone parents. 
1.2.2 DWP ESF funded employment provision  
In 2007 the DWP acting in its CFO role (henceforth, reference to DWP will 
unless otherwise stated refer to its CFO role) contracted £265 million worth of 
ESF funded employment provision spread across 74 contracts and 26 
                                                 
10 Regional Government Offices closed at the end of March in 2011 (a long time after the 
focus of this study) and their ESF responsibilities were handed back to the Managing 
Authority in DWP. 
11 The financing was different in the 2000-2006 programme: ESF applicant organisations had 
to supply their own match funding for projects, in a process known as direct bidding. 
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providers, lasting for three years between 2008 and 2011.12 Our present 
impact analysis is focused on participants entering the programme within the 
first year (between June 2008 and April 2009) of this part of ESF provision. 
The key features of DWP ESF funded provision are:  
 
- Entry onto the programme is voluntary;  
 
- Support adds value to existing employment programmes, with a particular 
focus on disadvantaged groups; 
 
- The key incentive for providers is job outcome payments. For most 
contracts 50 percent of the total funding was linked to the achievement of 
job outcomes. For 11 contracts this was 40 per cent and for the remaining 
four contracts it was 70 per cent; 
 
- The contracts were projected to provide 240,000 places, with a job entry 
rate of 36% to yield 85,000 job entries. This is equivalent to an average 
cost of £1,100 per start and £3,100 per job outcome; 
 
- There is substantial flexibility in the type of provision that can be offered 
and provision varies between contracts. The DWP co-financing body 
categorises the contracts into three broad types of provision: 
 
o Tailored (a flexible, personalised approach) - 51 contracts, cost 
£190m; 
 
o Targeted (contracts in which provision is specified to particular 
needs – for example helping participants with English language 
barriers or participants with a disability) - 19 contracts, cost £70m; 
 
o Intermediate Labour Market (high unit cost contracts for providing 
subsidised temporary employment with the aim of providing a 
bridge back to the labour market) – four contracts, cost £5m; 
 
- There is significant variation in projected job entry rates and unit costs 
across contracts, providers and regions. For example, lower and upper 
quartile unit costs per job entry across contracts are £2,500 and £5,000 
respectively; and 
 
- The original intention was that the majority of referrals would be through 
direct recruitment by the provider. The ESF cohort survey of participants in 
2009 (Drever and Lloyd, 2010) suggests this has not been the case and 
that about three quarters found out about ESF employment provison via 
Jobcentre Plus. 
 
In the case of the DWP CFO, ‘matched’ funding is provided for by the New 
Deal and Pathways contracts. The analysis in this paper is concerned only 
                                                 
12 11 more contracts were contracted in 2008-09 using money released from a changing 
pound-euro exchange rate, but these started after the period analysed in this paper.  
 10
with estimating the impacts of DWP support offered under direct ESF funding 
and does not include support offered under the matched funding. 
1.2.3 Participation on the Current Programme 
Participation under the DWP CFO began in June 2008 in the economic 
context of rising unemployment caused by the recession. Figure 1.1 shows 
how participant inflows onto DWP ESF funded provision increased to about 
7,000 per month by summer 2009, from which point the inflows remained 
fairly constant. The number of participant starts reached a cumulative total of 
about 98,000 by the end of November 2009. Of these participants, a higher 
than expected proportion were receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance (particularly 
short term claimants) when they started on ESF13: 68,000 were claiming JSA 
at the start of their provision of whom 70% had been on benefit for less than 
six months and almost 50% had been on benefit for less than three months; 
6,000 were claiming IB or ESA; 11,000 were claiming Income Support; while 
the remaining 12,000 were not in receipt of benefit when they started ESF 
provision. The average course length across all participants was about three 
and a half months. 
Figure 1.1: Monthly inflows and cumulative participation on DWP ESF 
funded provision  
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Source: ESF evaluation database; starts between June 2008 and November 2009. 
 
By the end of July 2010, almost all participants who started provision between 
June 2008 and November 2009 had left provision. Of these participants, 26% 
had entered employment14. Most of these entered employment within a few 
months of starting provision: of those who entered employment a fifth had 
                                                 
13 The focus on JSA customers in these contracts was influenced by the recession and 
directives received after contracts were already in place to use ESF to support JSA 
customers as much as possible within the contracts’ terms of delivery. 
14 Entry to employment as defined here is when the provider received a job outcome payment 
from DWP. 
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done so within one month, and over half had done within three months. This 
pace of entry into employment is not unusual in the context of other 
employment programmes; the impact study evaluation of the New Deal for 
Disabled People (NDDP)15 (Orr et al., 2006) reported that of those who 
participated on NDDP, a third of those who secured jobs had done so within a 
month and 55% within three months. 
 
ESF provision is available in all Jobcentre Plus districts in England. However, 
the take-up of ESF varies across these districts, ranging from a few hundred 
participants in districts with the lowest take-up to a few thousand in districts 
with the highest take-up by the end of November 2009. In terms of take-up as 
a proportion of the benefit caseload, JSA claimants who start on ESF 
provision represent between 1% and 14% of the average JSA caseload over 
the same time period for each district. The median and upper quartile take-up 
proportions are 4% and 7% respectively, which means that there is only a 
small group of districts that have notably higher take-up than the rest of the 
country.  
1.2.4 Performance variation across contracts 
There is substantial variation across the contracts in terms of both participant 
characteristics and job entries. Figure 1.2 shows a basic measure of the 
performance of all large ESF contracts (those with more than 500 participants 
– 55 contracts). It plots job entry rates of all customers who started provision 
between June 2008 and the end of November 2009 against the proportion of 
participants who have spent more than one of the past two years on benefit 
for each contract. This measure of benefit history is a proxy for the extent to 
which contracts support disadvantaged participants. The average job entry 
rate for all participants is 26% and the average proportion of all participants 
who have spent more than one of the past two years on benefit is 36%. Those 
towards the top right are considered to be the best performing contracts as 
they have a high proportion of disadvantaged customers, but are nevertheless 
achieving high job entry rates.  
 
Figure 1.2 indicates broad variation in contract performance when assessed 
using this basic measure. This could suggest a high degree of heterogeneity 
in the effectiveness of ESF provision across the range of support offered by 
different contracts. We explore this possible explanation in Section 4.3 where 
we compare impacts achieved by groups of contracts with similar 
characteristics.  
 
 
                                                 
15 NDDP is a major employment programme for people claiming IB and other disability 
benefits in the UK. It is similar in size to ESF (in 2005, 5000 participants/month, with a cost of 
£75m).     
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Figure 1.2: Contract Performance – Job entry rate by Benefit History 
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Source: ESF evaluation database; contract performance of starts between June 2008 
and November 2009. 
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2 Data and Sample Definition 
This section outlines the data and sample definition used in the impact 
evaluation. In Section 2.1, we describe the method of drawing samples from 
which we derive groups of participants and non-participants for comparison. 
Section 2.2 describes the administrative data sources and variables used in 
the evaluation. Section 2.3 provides some descriptive statistics for our 
participant and non-participant samples. Finally, Section 2.4 describes the 
benefit rates of participants and non-participants within these samples. 
2.1 Sample definition 
A key feature of ESF employment provision is that it is available to anyone 
who is not in employment, regardless of their current benefit status or prior 
interaction with the benefits system. This broad eligibility leads to a greater 
heterogeneity of participant characteristics than might be expected for other 
DWP employment programmes where eligibility may be dependent on receipt 
of particular benefits and/or the duration of a benefit claim.  
 
It is difficult to estimate impacts for a highly heterogeneous group of 
participants for two main reasons. Firstly, the impacts of the programme are 
likely to vary across the range of participant characteristics. Secondly, if a 
group of participants is highly heterogeneous with regard to observed 
characteristics then it is also likely to be highly heterogeneous with regard to 
unobserved characteristics. Estimating impacts for a programme with a highly 
heterogeneous participant group is therefore more likely to result in a biased 
estimate than for a programme with specific eligibility requirements. 
 
For this reason, when performing our primary analysis we estimate impacts 
separately for two broad groups of participants: 
  
1. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) customers; 
2. Incapacity Benefit (IB) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
customers. 
 
We describe in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 the method used for drawing samples 
of JSA and IB/ESA customers for use in this primary analysis.  
 
In Section 4.3, we additionally explore the heterogeneity of impacts of the ESF 
programme on the primary JSA customer group, by estimating impacts for 
specific participant sub-groups and different types of employment support 
offered under the ESF programme. 
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2.1.1 Defining the ESF participant samples 
Both the JSA and the IB/ESA participant samples are drawn from the ESF 
administrative data set. For inclusion in our primary analysis, participants must 
meet the following conditions: 
 
- Participants must be claiming the appropriate benefit (JSA or IB/ESA) at 
the start date of their ESF provision; 
- The benefit spell must start after June 2005;16 
- The ESF start date must be between June 2008 and April 2009;17 
 
The resulting participant sample sizes are 25,720 for JSA recipients and 1,970 
for IB and ESA recipients. 
2.1.2 Defining the non-participant samples 
To provide a suitable comparison pool of benefit customers who did not 
participate on the ESF programme, we also draw two samples (one for JSA 
customers and one for IB/ESA customers) of non-participants using 
equivalent selection criteria to those used to draw the participant samples. 
 
To compare the outcomes of participants and non-participants over a time 
period such that non-participants can represent what would have happened to 
ESF participants if they had not participated, we assign a pseudo start date to 
each non-participant. The pseudo start date for non-participants is treated as 
equivalent to the actual start date for participants. More details of how these 
dates are generated are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
For inclusion in our primary analysis, non-participants must meet the following 
conditions: 
 
- The non-participants must be claiming the appropriate benefit (JSA or 
IB/ESA) at their pseudo start date; 
- The benefit spell must start after June 2005; 
- The pseudo start date must be between June 2008 and April 2009;  
 
The resulting non-participant sample sizes are 732,600 for JSA customers 
and 406,430 for IB/ESA customers.  
 
In Section 3 we describe how suitable ‘matched’ groups of participants and 
non-participants are selected from these samples and compared to estimate 
                                                 
16 This excluded a small number of records (2%), in which the benefit start date was prior to 
June 2005. This decision was taken for pragmatic reasons – extending the analysis to older 
claims would have resulted in a much larger non-participant sample and a corresponding 
increase in computational requirements. 
17 This provided a cohort of participants for whom we had a minimum of 52 weeks of outcome 
data.  
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the impacts of ESF support. This selection is carried out using a Propensity 
Score Matching methodology. 
2.2 Data sources and variables 
The evaluation is carried out using administrative data derived from two main 
sources: 
 
- DWP administrative databases, which provide details of spells on DWP 
benefits, characteristics of DWP customers and spells on employment 
programmes including ESF; and 
 
- Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Tax System, which 
provides details of spells in employment.  
 
It is widely recognised that there are both advantages and disadvantages to 
using administrative data compared with, for example, survey data. We outline 
below some of the broad differences between these two methods: 
 
- Administrative data allows for a much larger sample size (close to the 
population) than survey data; 
 
- Survey data tends to suffer from non-response; 
 
- Administrative data allows variables and outcomes to be tracked over a 
longer period than survey data, which generally offers only a snapshot in 
time;  
 
- However, administrative data is limited to a pre-defined set of variables, 
while survey data can provide a richer data set tailored to a specific 
research question. 
 
While survey data could provide additional variables with which to control for 
participant characteristics (as found by for example Dolton and Smith, 2011), 
the present study uses purely administrative data for the following reasons: 
 
- The larger sample size allows us to explore the heterogeneity of the 
programme impacts with regard to participant characteristics and types of 
support (see Section 4.3); and 
 
- The cost and time associated with the analysis are substantially less when 
using only administrative data. 
2.2.1 Description of Variables  
We outline below in Table 2.1 the variables used in the analysis. We discuss 
the importance of these variables in controlling for selection onto the 
programme in Section 3. 
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Table 2.1: Variables and values used in the analysis 
 
Variable Type Values 
Gender Categorical Male; Female 
Age, (and Aged squared)18 Numerical Integer values 
Disability Categorical Not disabled; Disabled; Unknown 
Ethnicity Categorical White; Black; Asian; Mixed; Chinese; Other; Unknown 
Marital status Categorical Single; Married; Widowed; Divorced; Separated; Cohabiting; Unknown 
Sought occupation  Categorical 26 broad categories: e.g. “Administrative”; “Health Professionals”; “Sales Occupations” 
Government Office Region Categorical 9 regions in England 
Lone Parent Categorical Lone Parent; Couple; Not a Parent; Unknown 
Low Qualified Categorical No; Yes; Unknown 
Jobcentre Plus District Categorical 38 districts in England; and Unknown 
Benefit start month19 Categorical 47 months from June 2005 to April 2009 
ESF start month Categorical 11 months from June 2008 to April 2009 
Indices of multiple 
deprivation20: 
- Income 
- Employment 
- Health 
- Education 
- Housing 
- Crime 
- Living environment 
Numerical Continuous values, available from Government data website21  
Benefit labour market 
history Categorical 
104 binary variables – one representing 
each of the 104 weeks prior to ESF start 
date. Values are: receiving benefit; not 
receiving benefit 
Work labour market history Categorical 
104 binary variables – one representing 
each of the 104 weeks prior to ESF start 
date. Values are: in work; not in work 
                                                 
18 Age squared is included as the literature extensively shows a non linear relationship 
between employment and age. 
19 Benefit start and end dates refer to the benefit spell during which the ESF support is 
received. 
20 The Indices of Multiple Deprivation are variables which describe local deprivation in each of 
the 32,482 super output areas across the country. They cover a range of economic, social 
and housing issues.  
21 http://data.gov.uk/dataset/index_of_multiple_deprivation_imd_2007 
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JSA Programme22 History Numerical 
Number of weeks on JSA programmes in 
two years prior to ESF start date: 
Integers from 0 to 104 
Other Programme23 History Numerical 
Number of weeks on other programmes in 
two years prior to ESF start date: 
Integers from 0 to 104 
 
To capture the labour market history of individuals, we use two series of 
binary variables which indicate whether each person was in/out of work and 
receiving/not receiving benefit in each of 104 weeks prior to their ESF start 
date. In our analysis of JSA customers, we use individuals’ JSA receipt over 
this period, while in our analysis of IB and ESA customers, we use individuals’ 
IB and ESA receipt. In Appendix 1, we compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach with those of a more commonly used method 
in the literature and adopted by, for example, Card and Sullivan (1988). 
 
In our analysis of IB/ESA customers, we additionally include the variables 
outlined in Table 2.2, which provide more information about an individual’s 
benefit claim and the nature of their health condition and/or disability.  
 
Table 2.2: Variables and values additionally used in analysis of IB/ESA 
recipients 
 
Variable Type Values 
Benefit Type Categorical Incapacity Benefit; Employment Support Allowance 
Health Condition Categorical 
Circulatory/Respiratory; Injury/Poisoning; 
Mental Health Condition; Musculo-skeletal; 
Nervous System; Other; None recorded 
Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA) recipient  Categorical 
Receiving DLA; Not receiving DLA  
(at any time since June 2005) 
Mental Health Group Categorical 
Alcohol/Drug abuse; Mood disorder; Stress; 
Mental Development disorder; Other; None 
recorded 
DLA care component Categorical Higher; Lower; Medium; None; Unknown 
DLA mobility component Categorical Higher; Lower; None; Unknown 
 
The health condition and Mental Health Group variables are derived from GP 
certificates submitted as part of the benefit claim.  
                                                 
22 JSA programmes include: New Deal for Young People (NDYP), New Deal for the Long 
Term Unemployed (NDLTU), Basic Skills and Work Based Learning for Adults (WBLA). 
23 Other programmes include: Pathways, New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), New Deal 50 
Plus, New Deal Innovation Fund (NDIF), New Deal for Disabled Peple (NDDP), Employment 
Zones (EZ), Action Teams, Outreach and New Deal for Partners (NDP).  
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2.2.2 Data quality issues 
HMRC employment data 
There are a number of well documented issues with the quality of the HMRC 
employment data. These are briefly described below. 
 
1. Employment spells are only recorded when a tax form is submitted. 
Some employment spells, such as those corresponding to self 
employment and individuals not earning higher than the income tax 
Personal Allowance for the relevant year, are therefore not recorded;  
 
2. Any employment spells which are known to have started in a particular 
tax year, but on an unknown date during that year, are automatically 
given a start date of 6th April. This is the earliest date on which they 
could actually have started. Similarly, any employment spells which are 
known to have ended in a particular tax year, but at an unknown point 
during that year, are automatically given an end date of 5th April. This is 
the latest date on which they could actually have ended. The net effect 
of this is that the length of many employment spells will be 
overestimated; and 
 
3.  A small number of records contain other known errors, such as 
missing start dates or missing end dates. 
  
Within our sample, approximately 35% of employment spells have a 
suspected error, as defined above. This proportion is the same among 
participants and non-participants. Moreover, the proportion of each type of 
error identified is also the same among participants and non-participants. 
Therefore we would not expect any systematic bias to result from these 
errors. As in other evaluation studies, such as Beale et al. (2008) we have 
followed advice to mitigate the problem of all dates with errors, by randomly 
assigning start and end dates within the appropriate tax year for records in 
which they are unknown.  
 
Appendix 6 discusses an alternative method of cleaning the HMRC 
employment data which we explored in our model development stage. 
DWP administrative data 
The DWP administrative data sets also contain missing values because 
advisers do not always fill in some characteristic fields during client interviews. 
This is particularly the case for variables identifying lone parents, ethnicity and 
disability. In the case of variables with missing values, ‘unknown’ is treated as 
a valid category for controlling for participant characteristics.  
 
The proportion of missing values among JSA customers is around 9% for 
ethnicity, 7% for occupational choice, 2% for marital status, 2% for disability, 
2% for district, 52% for lone parent and 75% for low qualified. The proportion 
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of missing values for each variable is broadly similar among ESF participants 
and non-participants.  
 
The proportion of missing values among IB/ESA customers is higher and 
there are greater differences between participants and non-participants. 
Among IB/ESA customers for example, 11% of participants have unknown 
ethnicity compared with 24% of non-participants; 31% of participants have 
unknown occupational choice compared with 47% of non-participants; 28% of 
participants have unknown marital status compared with 38% of non-
participants; and 12% of participants have unknown (health) condition 
compared with 5% of non-participants.  
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we describe the basic characteristics of ESF participants and 
non-participants in the JSA and IB/ESA samples. Table 2.3 lists summary 
statistics detailing personal and demographic characteristics, benefit receipt, 
and participation on DWP employment programmes other than ESF. This 
table includes only a few of the most pertinent characteristics – for a full list of 
variables and their value ranges, refer back to Tables 2.1 and 2.2. We note 
below some of the key differences between participants and non-participants 
within each of the JSA and IB/ESA samples. We also describe the key 
differences between the JSA and IB/ESA non-participant samples to gain an 
understanding of the overall differences between customers receiving each of 
these benefits. 
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of the JSA and IB/ESA primary samples 
 
JSA       
Participants  
JSA Non-
Participants
IB/ESA       
Participants  
IB/ESA Non-
Participants
Observations 25,720 732,610 1,970 406,430
Age (mean years) 37 34 40 43
Male (%) 80 73 67 56
Disabled (%) 28 21 73 67
Ethnic minority (%) 17 16 8 10
Low Qualified (%) 18 20 20 10
Lone Parent (%) 2 3 5 8
Deprivation score above 50 (%) 21 17 16 16
Single (%) 59 63 42 35
Married (%) 19 17 15 13
Seeking Professional / Management job (%) 7 12 8 5
Receiving JSA at ESF start (%) 100 100 0 0
Receiving IB at ESF start (%) 0 0 83 91
Receiving ESA at ESF start (%) 0 0 17 9
Proportion of past year spent receiving JSA (%) 45 41 8 6
Proportion of past year spent receiving IB /ESA (%) 4 3 62 73
Proportion of past year spent in employment (%) 44 42 43 31
Benefit Duration at start of programme (mean weeks) 20 22 47 66
Proportion of past year spent on JSA programmes (%) 3 2 1 1
Proportion of past year spent on other programmes (%) 5 4 45 28
Mental Health Condition (%) - - 45 39
Receives IB Credit only (%) - - 16 46
Received Disability Living Allowance (DLA) within 2 years (%) - - 29 36
High DLA care component (%) - - 3 7
High DLA mobility component (%) - - 7 17
Personal / Demographic Characteristics
Benefit Receipt
DWP Programme Participation
Additional characteristics known only for IB/ESA customers
 
 
 
Notes:  
 
Deprivation scores range from 0 to 100. Higher deprivation scores are associated with 
more deprived areas, so a higher proportion with scores over 50 is indicative of more 
deprivation among the participants within the sample. 
2.3.1 JSA customers: comparing ESF participants with non-
participants 
The mean age of an ESF participant in receipt of JSA is 37 years, compared 
with 34 years for a non-participant. Fewer participants (20%) than non-
participants (27%) are female and there is a higher rate of disability among 
participants (28%) than non-participants (21%).  
 
There are similar proportions of ethnic minorities, low qualifications and lone 
parents among participants and non-participants. More participants (21%) 
than non-participants (17%) live in highly deprived areas. A lower proportion 
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of participants (59%) than non-participants (63%) are single. A lower 
proportion of participants (7%) are looking for professional or management 
jobs than non-participants (12%). 
 
Participants tend to have spent more of the past year receiving JSA (45%) 
than non-participants (41%) and more of the past year on programmes other 
than ESF than non-participants. 
 
Overall, these statistics suggest that JSA customers who participate on ESF 
are more disadvantaged than JSA customers who do not participate.  
2.3.2 IB/ESA customers: comparing ESF participants with 
non-participants 
The mean age of an ESF participant in receipt of IB or ESA is 40 years, 
compared with 43 years for IB and ESA non-participants. Fewer participants 
(33%) than non-participants (44%) are female and there is a higher rate of 
disability24 among participants (73%) than non-participants (67%).  
 
There is a slightly lower proportion of ethnic minorities among participants 
(8%) than non-participants (10%). More participants have low qualifications 
(20%) and fewer are lone parents (5%) than non-participants (10% and 8% 
respectively). A similar proportion of participants (16%) and non-participants 
(16%) live in highly deprived areas. A higher proportion of participants (42%) 
than non-participants (35%) are single and a higher proportion of participants 
(8%) are looking for professional or management jobs than non-participants 
(5%). 
 
Participants tend to have spent less of the past year receiving IB or ESA 
(62%) than non-participants (73%) and more (45%) of the past year on 
programmes other than ESF than non-participants (28%). Participants are 
also more likely to be in receipt of ESA (17%) than non-participants (9%) and 
correspondingly less likely to be in receipt of IB (83%) than non-participants 
(91%).  
 
A higher proportion of participants (45%) than non-participants (39%) have a 
mental health condition. A much lower proportion of participants (16%) than 
non-participants (46%) are in receipt of Incapacity Benefit credits only, 
indicating less employment history among non-participants. 
 
Overall, these statistics suggest that IB/ESA customers who participate on 
ESF are less disadvantaged than IB/ESA customers who do not participate.  
                                                 
24 This is the proportion with a disability marker on the DWP Labour Market System. Other 
studies suggest that actual proportions with disability may be higher. 
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2.3.3 Comparing the JSA and IB/ESA non-participant samples 
Non-participants in receipt of IB or ESA tend to be much older (with a mean of 
43 years) than non-participants in receipt of JSA (with a mean of 34 years). A 
higher proportion of the JSA sample is male (73%) than the IB/ESA sample 
(56%). Disabled customers make up a much higher proportion of the IB/ESA 
sample (67%) than the JSA sample (21%). There are fewer ethnic minorities 
among the IB/ESA sample (10%) than the JSA sample (16%).  
 
There are more low qualified (20%) and fewer lone parents in the JSA sample 
(3%) than the IB/ESA sample (10% and 8% respectively). A similar proportion 
of the JSA and IB/ESA samples live in areas of high deprivation (17% and 
16% respectively). A higher proportion of the JSA sample are single (63%) 
than the IB/ESA sample (35%) and more are seeking professional or 
management jobs (12%) than the IB/ESA sample (5%). 
 
IB and ESA recipients tend to have spent more of the past year receiving 
benefits, less in employment and more on employment programmes other 
than ESF than JSA recipients. 
2.4 Comparing benefit rates of participants and non-
participants 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the benefit rates of participants and non-participants 
in our primary analysis samples of JSA customers and IB/ESA customers. 
The benefit rates shown are for the complete sample in each case, i.e. before 
any attempt is made to select groups of participants and non-participants with 
similar characteristics. Differences between participants and non-participants 
are therefore not attributable to impacts of the ESF programme, but rather a 
combination of programme impacts and differences in the characteristics of 
those who participate and those who do not. 
 
Figure 2.1: JSA receipt rate 
among participants and non-
participants 
Figure 2.2: IB/ESA receipt rate 
among participants and non-
participants 
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For JSA customers, we note that ESF participants and non-participants have 
similar rates of benefit receipt until around 40 weeks before the ESF 
programme start (or pseudo start for non-participants) date. Over the 40 week 
period leading up to the ESF start date, there is a higher rate of benefit receipt 
among those who go on to participate compared with those who do not. 
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Similarly, in the 52 weeks after the start date, there is a higher rate of benefit 
receipt (typically four percentage points higher) among participants than non-
participants. 
 
For IB/ESA customers a very different situation is observed. There is a much 
lower rate of benefit receipt among participants than non-participants over the 
full 104 weeks prior to the ESF programme start (or pseudo start) date. 
Similarly, in the 52 weeks after the start date, there is a lower rate of benefit 
receipt among participants than non-participants. The difference between the 
participant and non-participant groups increases more rapidly after the ESF 
start date, such that 52 weeks after the programme start, the difference (-20 
percentage points) is greater than at any time in the pre-programme period (a 
maximum difference of -15 percentage points). 
 
Overall, these observations suggest that among JSA customers, participants 
tend to be further from the labour market than those who do not participate. 
Conversely, among IB/ESA customers, participants tend to be closer to the 
labour market than non-participants. 
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3 Methodology 
In this section, we outline the methodology used in this study to estimate the 
average effect of the ESF employment programme on its participants 
(average effect of treatment on the treated, ATT). In Section 3.1 we describe 
the Conditional Independence Assumption, which forms the foundation of 
impact evaluations of this type. We describe in Section 3.2 the Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) methodology used to control for selection bias and 
construct suitable counterfactuals for our ESF participant groups. Section 3.3 
describes the method used to measure the labour market outcomes of 
participants and non-participants in our samples, and of using these outcomes 
to estimate the net impacts of ESF employment support. Finally in Section 
3.4, we briefly outline an extensive sensitivity analysis conducted during our 
model development stage to establish the robustness of our methodology.  
3.1 Conditional Independence Assumption 
Our aim is to estimate the average effect of the ESF employment programme 
on its participants (average effect of treatment on the treated, ATT). A simple 
comparison between the employment and benefit outcomes of participants 
with those of non-participants could be biased if there are systematic 
differences between these groups which may be related to the labour market 
outcomes of interest (see Table 2.3). However, if we can control for 
observable differences in characteristics between the participant and non-
participant groups, the outcome that would result in the absence of treatment 
is the same in both cases (Bryson, et al. 2002). This identifying assumption for 
matching is known as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). It 
enables us to infer the counterfactual outcome for ESF participants, and 
therefore to attribute any differences between carefully matched participant 
and non-participant groups to the effect of the programme. We control for 
characteristics using a Propensity Score Matching methodology, as described 
in Section 3.2. 
 
The following section discusses how our individual level data (as described in 
Section 2) allows us to try to control for the difference in typical characteristics 
between those who participate on the ESF programme and those who do not. 
Differences in characteristics between these two groups arise as a result of 
the way participants are selected onto the programme, and are therefore 
known as selection bias.  
3.1.1 Controlling for selection bias 
The majority of ESF participants are referred onto the programme by 
Jobcentre Plus with a minority recruited by providers. Therefore selection onto 
the programme is determined by two main interconnecting factors:  
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1. Selection decisions made by Jobcentre Plus advisors; and  
2. Self-selection by the individual.  
 
In deciding whether to recommend ESF provision to a potential participant, a 
Jobcentre Plus advisor is likely to consider whether the person needs 
additional help to move away from benefit and into employment and the extent 
to which the ESF programme is likely to meet these needs.25 It will ultimately 
be a judgment by the adviser but is likely to depend on the demographic 
characteristics of the participant, the type of job sought, the perceived 
motivation of the participant, the availability of ESF in the local area, the 
familiarity of the particular Jobcentre Plus advisor with ESF, and the 
availability of other employment programmes in the area. The factors which 
influence a potential participant’s self-selection onto the programme are 
similar to those which influence the advisor - it will largely depend on whether 
they feel that ESF will improve their labour market prospects and the extent to 
which they actually want to improve their labour market prospects. These 
factors will be driven by demographic characteristics, motivation and 
circumstance. Since ESF is a voluntary programme, the final participation 
decision will be a mutual decision reached after a discussion between the 
participant and the advisor. 26 
 
To allow us to control for the selection bias which results from the complex 
interaction between advisor and participant, we have collected demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, ethnic group, disability, qualification, 
marital status and lone parent status (see Section 2.2) for a large number of 
participants and non-participants. We have also obtained each individual’s 
stated primary occupation choice. Since labour market prospects may be 
highly dependent on dynamic local labour market characteristics and the local 
availability of employment provision, we have also collected each individual’s 
geographical district and their Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores27 at 
a local super output area level.  
 
While we have not been able to directly observe each individual’s level of 
motivation, we have collected a number of proxy variables which attempt to 
indirectly capture this characteristic. For example, we have constructed 
weekly labour market history variables for each individual and also collected 
data detailing time spent on other DWP employment programmes.  
 
There are likely to be many other unobserved variables, which to varying 
extents, play a role in the participation decision. The value of having a rich 
data set is that, as described above for the motivation characteristic, some of 
the variables which we have observed will indirectly capture the influence of 
                                                 
25 In the smaller number of cases where participants are directly recruited onto the 
programme by providers, we expect similar criteria to be considered in the selection process.  
26 The criteria for selection suggested in this section are broadly supported by ongoing 
qualitative research into Priority 1 and 4 provision, which is expected to be published in the 
summer of 2011. 
27 Separate IMD scores are included for: employment, Income, Health, Education, Housing, 
Crime and Living environment. 
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variables we have not observed. For example, while we have not been able to 
observe personality type, life experience, experience of discrimination, 
confidence, health, language skills or happiness, we believe that by controlling 
for gender, age, ethnicity, disability, local deprivation, labour market history, 
prior programme participation etc. the model will capture some of their 
influence by proxy. 
3.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The aim of the matching process is to construct a comparison group of 
individuals who did not participate on the ESF programme, but who have 
identical characteristics to those who did participate. If this is successfully 
achieved, we can then use the labour market outcomes of non-participants in 
the comparison group as an approximation for what the labour market 
outcomes of participants in our treatment group would have been if they had 
not participated. 
 
When there are a large number of observed characteristics, as is the case in 
the present evaluation, direct matching on all characteristics becomes a 
limited device as the number of dimensions becomes large compared to the 
number of observations (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Therefore, we follow 
the literature in using a single balancing score on which to match, which is a 
function of all the observed covariates. The balancing score we use is a 
propensity score, which is the probability of an individual participating on the 
programme given their observed characteristics. We describe below the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) protocol used in this evaluation to construct 
suitable treatment and comparison groups from our participant and non-
participant samples. Appendix 3 shows a step-by-step guide to the protocol.  
 
For each participant and non-participant in the sample, a ‘propensity score’ is 
calculated. This defines the probability of the individual participating on the 
ESF programme, given their observed characteristics. The score is calculated 
using a probit regression model, where the binary participation variable is the 
dependent variable, and the observed individual characteristics are the 
independent variables. In the probit model used for our analysis of JSA 
recipients, all variables except low qualified were significant at the 1% level. In 
the probit model used for our analysis of IB/ESA recipients, all variables 
except DLA Care Component, ESF start date and marital status were 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
We construct matched treatment and comparison groups using a Kernel ‘one-
to-many’ PSM approach. For each participant in the sample, all non-
participants with propensity scores within the Kernel bandwidth are selected 
and weighted using an Epanechnikov distribution. The result is a matched 
comparison group of non-participants with a total weighting equal to the 
number of participants in the final treatment group. The matching was carried 
out using an adaptation of the Stata code applied by Thomas (2006), which 
relies on the Stata module psmatch2 written by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
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3.2.1 Common Support for Participants 
For Propensity Score Matching to be a viable methodology, there must be 
sufficient common support for participants among the non-participant sample. 
This means that we must be able to find matching non-participants for the vast 
majority of our participants. This is important as any impact estimates are only 
valid for those participants for whom common support is available.  
 
The bandwidth used in the Kernel matching determines how closely the 
propensity score of a non-participant must be to that of a participant for 
selection into the final matched comparison group. After testing the sensitivity 
of our impact estimates and common support to a range of bandwidths in the 
model development stage (see Appendix 6), we chose a bandwidth of 0.0001 
for our primary analysis. This was felt to provide a model which retained a 
high level of common support, whilst also ensuring a tight match between 
non-participants and participants.  
 
The propensity score distribution for our primary JSA estimate is given below; 
each point is the cumulative proportion of the group with propensity scores in 
increments of 0.001.  
 
Figure 3.1: Primary JSA Analysis Propensity Score Distribution: 
(25,720 treatment records; 732,610 comparison records) 
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The graph shows that propensity scores tend to be higher among participants, 
although the mean score for both groups is low. The mean propensity score is 
0.03 (the proportion of all records which receive ESF support); 34% of non-
participants have a score of more than 0.03 compared with 68% of 
participants; also 4% of non-participants have scores more than 0.1 compared 
with 25% of participants. The small proportion of participants for whom no 
common support is available are those with the highest propensity scores.  
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The propensity score distribution for JSA recipients provides sufficient overlap 
between participants and non-participants, with over 98% of treatment records 
finding common support. 
 
The propensity score distribution for our primary IB and ESA estimate is 
provided in Appendix 4. We found a similar distribution of scores among 
participants and non-participants to that found among JSA recipients. As with 
the JSA scenario, our propensity score distribution for IB and ESA recipients 
provides sufficient overlap between participants and non-participants, with 
almost 99% of participants finding common support. 
3.2.2 Matching Quality 
We found our propensity score model to be highly effective in constructing 
treatment and comparison groups that are well balanced on the observed 
characteristics. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show specification statistics for the 
matching of the JSA and IB/ESA groups. The chi squared test shows that 
prior to the match, there was approximately zero probability that the treatment 
and comparison samples had the same set of characteristics. After matching 
there is statistically no difference between the matched groups in terms of 
observed variables. 
 
Table 3.1: Specification statistics for the JSA group matching 
 
Sample Pseudo R-sq LR chi-sq p>chi-sq 
Unmatched 0.12 25,780 0.000 
Matched 0.00 100 1.000 
 
Table 3.2: Specification statistics for the IB/ESA group matching 
 
Sample Pseudo R-sq LR chi-sq p>chi-sq 
Unmatched 0.14 3,460 0.000 
Matched 0.00 20 1.000 
 
 
Table 3.3 below shows the unmatched and matched means of a few select 
variables for the JSA treatment and comparison groups, while Table 3.4 
shows unmatched and matched means for the IB/ESA treatment and 
comparison groups. It can be seen that the PSM methodology has been 
extremely effective in balancing the groups on the observed covariates.  
 
Table 3.3 shows, for example, that the mean age of ESF participants in 
receipt of JSA is 37, while the mean age of the JSA non-participants is 34. 
Our Propensity Score Matching method produces matched treatment and 
comparison groups from the JSA samples, which both have a mean age of 
34. A similarly high quality of matching is observed across almost all variables 
within both our JSA and IB/ESA groups. 
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Table 3.3: Unmatched and matched means for primary JSA analysis 
 
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison % bias
% reduction 
in |bias| t p>|t|
Age (mean years) Unmatched 37 34 22 34.29 0.00
Matched 37 37 -1 96 -1.07 0.28
Female (%) Unmatched 20 27 -17 -25.52 0.00
Matched 20 21 -1 97 -0.66 0.51
Disabled (%) Unmatched 28 21 16 27.02 0.00
Matched 28 29 -3 85 -2.70 0.01
White ethnicity (%) Unmatched 74 77 -6 -9.35 0.00
Matched 74 74 0 99 -0.06 0.96
Black ethnicity (%) Unmatched 7 6 4 6.65 0.00
Matched 7 7 0 94 0.28 0.78
Married (%) Unmatched 19 17 5 7.72 0.00
Matched 19 18 1 87 0.70 0.48
On JSA 26 weeks Unmatched 39 33 12 19.35 0.00
before ESF start date (%) Matched 38 38 -1 96 -0.59 0.56
In work 26 weeks Unmatched 47 44 4 7.01 0.00
before ESF start date (%) Matched 47 46 1 81 0.94 0.35
Occupation choice - Unmatched 1 3 -11 -14.52 0.00
Corporate Managers (%) Matched 1 1 0 100 -0.05 0.96
ESF start date Unmatched 5 8 -11 -15.92 0.00
in August 2008 (%) Matched 6 6 -2 84 -2.17 0.03
Benefit Start Date Unmatched 10 7 8 13.56 0.00
in November 2008 (%) Matched 10 9 0 95 0.45 0.65
Region - North East (%) Unmatched 9 7 6 10.67 0.00
Matched 9 8 1 87 0.90 0.37
IMD income score (mean) Unmatched 24 23 14 21.32 0.00
Matched 24 24 0 99 -0.21 0.83
IMD employment score Unmatched 15 14 17 26.46 0.00
(mean) Matched 15 15 0 100 -0.09 0.93
JSA programme history Unmatched 3 2 4 7.51 0.00
(mean weeks) Matched 3 3 -5 -8 -4.82 0.00
Other programme history Unmatched 5 4 8 14.09 0.00
(mean weeks) Matched 5 5 -1 90 -0.81 0.42
District - Bedfordshire Unmatched 1 2 -10 -13.05 0.00
 & Hertfordshire (%) Matched 1 1 0 99 -0.14 0.89
Lone Parent (%) Unmatched 2 3 -6 -9.39 0.00
Matched 2 2 0 96 -0.35 0.73
Low Qualified (%) Unmatched 18 20 -4 -6.83 0.00
Matched 18 18 0 95 -0.25 0.80  
 
 
Notes: 
  
The % bias is the difference between the sample means in the treatment and 
comparison groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
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Table 3.4: Unmatched and matched means for primary IB/ESA analysis 
 
Variable Sample Treatment Comparison % bias
% reduction 
in |bias| t p>|t|
Age (mean years) Unmatched 40 43 -22 -8.96 0.00
Matched 40 40 1 96 0.27 0.79
Female (%) Unmatched 33 44 -21 -8.98 0.00
Matched 34 34 0 100 0.02 0.98
Disabled (%) Unmatched 73 67 13 5.79 0.00
Matched 73 73 0 98 0.08 0.94
White ethnicity (%) Unmatched 81 66 35 14.23 0.00
Matched 81 81 0 100 0.06 0.96
Married (%) Unmatched 15 13 4 1.89 0.06
Matched 15 15 0 94 0.08 0.93
On IB/ESA 26 weeks Unmatched 57 70 -27 -12.59 0.00
before ESF start date (%) Matched 57 57 0 99 0.09 0.93
In work 26 weeks Unmatched 45 32 27 12.33 0.00
before ESF start date (%) Matched 44 44 1 97 0.24 0.81
Occupation choice - Unmatched 1 1 1 0.24 0.81
Corporate Managers (%) Matched 1 1 0 28 -0.12 0.91
ESF start date Unmatched 6 8 -9 -3.81 0.00
in August 2008 (%) Matched 6 6 0 98 -0.06 0.95
Benefit Start Date Unmatched 7 3 16 8.72 0.00
in November 2008 (%) Matched 7 7 0 100 0.00 1.00
Region - North East (%) Unmatched 9 6 8 3.66 0.00
Matched 9 8 2 79 0.48 0.63
IMD employment score Unmatched 14 14 3 1.29 0.20
(mean) Matched 14 14 0 85 0.14 0.89
JSA programme history Unmatched 1 1 5 2.81 0.01
(mean weeks) Matched 1 1 -1 91 -0.13 0.89
Other programme history Unmatched 34 22 35 15.91 0.00
(mean weeks) Matched 33 33 1 97 0.28 0.78
District - Bedfordshire Unmatched 2 2 -3 -1.43 0.15
 & Hertfordshire (%) Matched 2 2 0 88 0.13 0.89
Lone Parent (%) Unmatched 5 8 -10 -3.91 0.00
Matched 6 6 -1 90 -0.33 0.74
Low Qualified (%) Unmatched 20 10 30 15.59 0.00
Matched 20 20 0 99 -0.10 0.92
Employment Support Unmatched 17 9 26 13.29 0.00
 Allowance Customer (%) Matched 17 17 -1 97 -0.22 0.82
Incapacity Benefit Unmatched 83 91 -26 -13.29 0.00
 Customer (%) Matched 83 83 1 97 0.22 0.82
Circulatory or Respiratory Unmatched 3 7 -15 -5.81 0.00
Health Condition (%) Matched 3 3 0 97 0.15 0.88
Alcohol or Drug Abuse Unmatched 55 61 -12 -5.27 0.00
Health Condition (%) Matched 55 54 1 93 0.26 0.79
Receiving Disability  Unmatched 29 36 -15 -6.31 0.00
Living Allowance (%) Matched 29 29 -1 96 -0.20 0.84  
 
 
 
Notes: 
  
The % bias is the difference between the sample means in the treatment and 
comparison groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
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For the JSA group, the matching results in a reduction in bias for 463 out of 
the 585 variables used in the propensity score model; while for the IB/ESA 
group, the matching results in a reduction in bias for all 606 variables used in 
the propensity score model. Within the JSA group, it is mostly the variables 
representing JSA receipt between 45 and 104 weeks before participation 
which do not incur any reduction in bias as a result of the matching. This 
simply reflects the fact that the treatment group and comparison population 
are actually very similar with regard to these variables even before matching. 
3.3 Measuring Outcomes and Impacts 
To estimate the average effect of the ESF employment programme on its 
participants (the average effect of treatment on the treated, ATT), we have 
measured three sets of outcome data for each participant. In each of the 52 
weeks following the start of the ESF programme, we measure whether the 
individual was: 
 
1. in receipt of their primary benefit28; 
2. in receipt of any main working age DWP benefit29; and 
3. in employment. 
 
We use DWP administrative data to determine individual benefit spells, and 
data originally sourced from the HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) tax 
system to determine employment spells. The outcomes measured are not 
mutually exclusive, so in any given week an individual may appear as both ‘in 
employment’ and ‘in receipt of benefit’. The outcome period covers an 
independently calculated period of time for each individual, spanning from the 
individual’s ESF/pseudo start date to 52 weeks later.  
 
By comparing the outcome data of the matched treatment and comparison 
groups, we are able to determine an estimate of the impact of the ESF 
programme on each outcome over time. When we present our results in 
Section 4, we therefore refer to the programme impacts on the likelihood of 
participants claiming their primary benefit, the likelihood of participants 
claiming any main working age benefit, and the likelihood of being in 
employment.  
 
To calculate the net impacts of the programme on a particular outcome for a 
given week, we first take the mean outcome value of the treatment group (i.e. 
the proportion of the group who are receiving benefit or are in employment) 
and subtract the weighted mean outcome value of the comparison group. 
Thus a raw net impact measure is the absolute percentage point difference 
between the treatment and weighted comparison groups for the 
corresponding outcome.  
 
                                                 
28 For our JSA recipient group this is Jobseeker’s Allowance; for our IB/ESA recipient group it 
is either of Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance. 
29 This refers to any of JSA, IB, ESA or IS. 
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However, it is possible that there is some residual bias which has not been 
fully captured by the variables used in our propensity score model. Therefore, 
we adjust our impact measure with a difference-in-difference adjustment 
between the pre- and post-programme periods to reduce any remaining bias.  
 
We calculate the difference-in-difference adjusted impacts using a linear 
probability model.30 The difference-in-differences adjustment to the impact 
uses the mean percentage point difference over the period from 104 weeks to 
52 weeks before the programme start date. This period was chosen as it is 
likely to be unaffected by any pre-programme anticipation effects, which may 
be responsible for an increase in benefit receipt among participants in the run 
up to the programme.  
 
The impacts presented in Section 4 are therefore the difference-in-differences 
adjusted impacts of the programme on each of the outcomes of interest. 
3.4 Sensitivity to methods 
During the development stages of our analysis, we explored the sensitivity of 
our impact estimates to the precise implementation of the PSM methodology. 
We performed the following sensitivity tests on subsets of our final primary 
JSA group: 
 
- sensitivity to time-based variables; 
- sensitivity to alternative pseudo start generation methods; 
- sensitivity to the Kernel bandwidth; and 
- sensitivity to alternative methods of cleaning the HMRC employment data; 
 
We found that our impact estimates were largely insensitive to each of these 
variations. This provided us with increased confidence that our methodology is 
robust and that our findings are not biased by the precise specification of our 
model. Further details of these sensitivity tests are provided in Appendix 6. 
 
 
                                                 
30 This produces consistent estimates for the difference in difference impacts but the standard 
errors suffer from heteroscedasticity and non-normality. There is some debate in the literature 
as to the best way to calculate errors without being too computationally intensive. Our method 
probably gives an overly cautious approach to errors; errors calculated by psmatch2 are up to 
half the size that we have reported and errors in other evaluations appear to be smaller for 
similar sample sizes, for example Lechner and Wunsch (2009).   
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4 Results 
In this section, we present our estimates of the average effect of the ESF 
employment programme on participants (the average effect of treatment on 
the treated, ATT). As discussed in Section 2.1, we have performed separate 
primary analyses for two main groups of participants:  
 
1. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) customers; and 
2. Incapacity Benefit (IB) or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
customers. 
 
In Section 4.1 we present our primary impact estimates for these participant 
groups. Section 4.2 then discusses a number of possible explanations for our 
findings. In Section 4.3 we explore the heterogeneity of the impacts of the 
ESF programme, with regard to its impact on specific sub-groups and also the 
heterogeneity of support provided. 
4.1 Primary Estimates for JSA and IB/ESA groups 
We present below our primary estimates for the average treatment effect of 
the ESF employment programme on our two main analysis groups: JSA 
customers and IB/ESA customers. Figures 4.1 to 4.6 show the net impacts of 
provision on each group with regard to receipt of primary benefit, receipt of 
any main working age DWP benefit and employment status over a 52 week 
period following ESF participation. We extend the impact graphs over a 104 
week period prior to ESF participation to illustrate the extent to which labour 
market history is controlled for over the pre-programme period. The graphs 
also show a 95% confidence interval around the central impact estimates.  
 
Figure 4.1: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming main benefit (JSA group) 
Figure 4.2: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming main benefit (IB/ESA 
group) 
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Figure 4.3: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming any working age benefit 
(JSA group) 
Figure 4.4: Impact on likelihood of 
claiming any working age benefit 
(IB/ESA group) 
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Figure 4.5: Impact on likelihood of 
being in employment (JSA group) 
Figure 4.6: Impact on likelihood of 
being in employment (IB/ESA 
group) 
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4.1.1 Net impacts on the JSA customer group 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the impact of the programme on JSA receipt for 
the JSA customer group is positive (between +1 percentage point and +3 
percentage points) in each of the 52 weeks following participation, which 
suggests that participation slightly increases an individual’s chances of 
claiming JSA over this period. This effect is statistically significant31 for 
most of the 52 week period. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that the impact of the programme on the receipt of any 
main working age benefit for this group is positive for the first 15 weeks after 
participation (between +1 percentage points and +3 percentage points), 
indicating that participation slightly increases an individual’s chances of 
claiming benefit over this period. Beyond 15 weeks after the start of 
participation the impact is not significantly different from zero. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.5, the impact of the programme on employment for 
this group is positive in each of the 52 weeks following participation, rising 
from 0 percentage points to +4.5 percentage points towards the end of this 
period. This indicates that participation increases an individual’s chances 
                                                 
31 Unless otherwise specified, we report results as statistically significant if they are significant 
at the 5% level. 
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of being in employment over this period. This effect increases over time 
and is statistically significant for almost all of the 52 week period. 
 
There is no contradiction in the finding that both the benefit and employment 
impact estimates are positive for the first 15 weeks following participation. 
This is because the impacts are not mutually exclusive and do not account for 
all possible outcomes. In Appendix 5 we show that the positive benefit and 
employment impacts are balanced by a negative impact on the labour market 
position ‘neither receiving benefit nor in employment’. 
4.1.2 Net impacts on the IB/ESA customer group 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the impact of the programme on IB/ESA receipt for 
the IB/ESA customer group is negative in each of the 52 weeks following 
participation (reaching a minimum of nearly -14 percentage points and then 
declining to -13 percentage points at 52 weeks), suggesting that participation 
substantially decreases an individual’s chances of claiming IB/ESA over 
this period. This effect is statistically significant for almost all of the 52 week 
period. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that the impact of the programme on the receipt of any 
main working age benefit for this group is also negative in each of the 52 
weeks following participation (reaching a minimum of almost -11 percentage 
points and then declining to -9 percentage points at 52 weeks), suggesting 
that participation substantially decreases an individual’s chances of 
claiming benefit over this period. This effect is also statistically significant 
for most of the 52 week period. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.6, the impact of the programme on employment for 
this group is positive in each of the 52 weeks following participation (peaking 
at +12 percentage points and then declining to +11 percentage points at 52 
weeks), suggesting that participation substantially increases an individual’s 
chances of being in employment over this period. This effect is statistically 
significant for almost all of the 52 week period. 
4.2 Discussion of Primary Estimates 
It is clear from the primary impact estimates that the effects of the ESF 
programme are not homogeneous across the two participant groups analysed 
(JSA customers and IB/ESA customers). The effect of ESF provision on the 
JSA group is fairly small: the impact on benefit receipt is close to zero, while 
the impact on employment reaches just +4.5 percentage points one year after 
the start of the programme. For the IB/ESA group, however, the programme’s 
effect is substantial: the impact on benefit receipt is -9 percentage points, 
while the impact on employment is +11 percentage points after one year.  
 
We discuss in this section a number of possible explanations for the observed 
impacts of ESF provision on participants in receipt of JSA and IB/ESA. 
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Voluntary JSA participants may not need ESF support 
The voluntary nature of ESF provision means that ESF participants are likely 
to be more ‘work-ready’ than non-participants. In addition to this, evidence has 
shown that over half of new JSA customers end their benefit claim within three 
months and three quarters end their benefit claim within six months (for 
example Thomas, 2007). It is therefore likely that many JSA customers who 
volunteer to participate on ESF could have achieved jobs without the 
additional support provided by ESF.  
 
While IB/ESA participants are also voluntary, and therefore likely to be more 
work-ready than non-participants, IB customers (who make up the majority of 
the IB/ESA participant group) have a lower base-level of employment support 
than JSA customers and also tend to be further away from the labour market. 
This could explain why impacts the of ESF provision are larger for the IB/ESA 
group than the JSA group. 
Programme ‘Lock In’ Effects  
Participants typically spend three and a half months receiving support from 
the ESF programme. This time on the programme reduces the time that 
participants may otherwise have spent on job-search activities. For 
participants who would have moved away from benefit quickly without 
support, the programme may therefore act to delay their move away from 
benefit. This could explain the low impacts observed for JSA customers, and 
in particular the initial sharp rise in benefit receipt among this group following 
the start of participation (shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.3). Similar evidence of 
so-called ‘lock-in’ effects was found in the recent evaluation by the European 
Commission (2010) into the impacts of ESF provision across four EU Member 
States. The report suggested that, “Impact in the short term is negative 
because people stop seeking jobs when they participate in a training 
programme (lock-in effect).” 
  
For IB and ESA recipients, benefit claims tend to last much longer, with many 
individuals claiming these benefits for several years. ESF participants in 
receipt of these benefits would therefore be much less likely to move away 
from benefit quickly in the absence of ESF support. We would therefore 
expect any ‘lock-in’ effect from time spent on the programme to be much less 
pronounced for this group of participants. 
Unobserved Benefits of the Programme 
It is possible that the programme is successful in moving some ESF 
participants a step closer to the labour market, but not to the extent that they 
enter employment or move away from benefit receipt. ‘Softer outcomes’, such 
as increased skills, confidence, motivation etc. would not be observed in our 
current short term impact measures, but may enhance the lives of participants 
in other ways. Such effects are also likely to manifest themselves in the longer 
term labour market outcomes of participants, which are beyond our current 
analysis period.  
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It is also possible that as participants learn new skills and develop confidence, 
they develop higher employment expectations, and therefore turn down less 
desirable jobs which they may otherwise have accepted. The effect of this is 
that participants may take longer to find work, but ultimately gain a more 
desirable job. This may be reflected by sustained outcomes over a longer 
term period of several years, but again may not be observable in our current 
short term impact measures.  
 
As more data becomes available it will be possible to explore this further by 
investigating the longer term impacts of the programme. 
The 2008-2009 Recession  
The cohort of participants analysed in the present study entered the ESF 
employment programme between June 2008 and April 2009. We have 
measured their labour market outcomes to April 2010. Our impact estimates 
therefore span a time period in which the UK was in a recession (2008-2009).  
 
As participants and non-participants were tracked over the same period, we 
do not expect the recession to have caused any systematic bias in our impact 
estimates. However, it is important to note that our estimates can only tell us 
what the impacts of the ESF programme were during the analysis period, 
which included the period of recession. The effectiveness of the programme 
may have been very different had it operated under different economic 
conditions. As more data becomes available, it will be possible to compare the 
impacts of the programme during and after the period of recession to gain 
more understanding of how the recession affected the impacts of the ESF 
programme. 
4.3 Sub-Group and Sub-Treatment analysis 
Our primary estimates described in Section 4.1 have shown that the impacts 
of the ESF employment programme on its participants (the average effect of 
treatment on the treated, ATT) vary substantially according to whether the 
participants are in receipt of JSA or IB/ESA. 
 
There are many reasons to expect that the impacts of the ESF programme 
are highly heterogeneous even within these broadly defined JSA and IB/ESA 
groups. The universal eligibility of the programme means that there is huge 
diversity in the characteristics of participants. It seems likely, for example, that 
a low-qualified 18 year old male from a poor neighbourhood will have a 
different participation experience from a highly qualified 50 year old female 
with a disability. There is also likely to be diversity in the type and 
effectiveness of support offered across the 74 DWP ESF contracts.  
 
In this section we investigate a number of sub-groups within our original 
primary JSA sample, which define specific characteristics of participants that 
we expect to influence both propensity to participate and labour market 
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outcomes. We do this by ‘hard matching’ on the most pertinent participant 
characteristics. This means that we ensure that non-participants in the 
comparison group are identical to participants in the treatment group with 
regard to the characteristic of interest. For example, when we consider the 
impacts of the programme on different age groups, we separate the 
participants and non-participants by age group before using PSM to select 
non-participants from the resulting pools based on other characteristics. 
 
In addition to allowing us to explore the heterogeneity of impacts, this ‘hard 
matching’ on the most pertinent participant characteristics has the additional 
advantage of providing a cleaner counterfactual. That is to say, because our 
groups are less heterogeneous with regard to observed characteristics, they 
are also likely to be less heterogeneous with regard to unobserved 
characteristics, thereby minimising any selection bias further prior to our 
difference-in-differences adjustment. 
 
We also investigate the effects of different treatments provided to the JSA 
cohort. Firstly, we estimate the impacts of groups of ESF contracts which 
share characteristics that could influence the type of provision offered. For 
example, we consider the impacts of provision offered by private, public and 
third sector providers respectively. Secondly, we investigate whether the 
effectiveness of ESF support has varied over time by estimating the impacts 
of provision over two different cohort periods.  
 
Table 4.1 below briefly introduces the sub-groups and sub-treatments 
considered in our analysis, while Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 provide a more in 
depth discussion of the social and economic rationale for selecting these 
specific groups and treatments. 
 
Table 4.1: Sub-groups and Sub-treatments for analysis 
 
Sub-Groups Sub-Treatments
Grouped by Age Treated by Sector
Grouped by District Treated by Funding model
Grouped by Benefit duration Treated by Provision type
Grouped by Gender Treated by Unit cost
Grouped by Ethnicity Treated by Contract size
Grouped by Disability Treated by Cohort period  
 
We note that our sub-group and sub-treatment analyses are restricted to JSA 
customers only. We were unable to explore the IB and ESA group in this way, 
due to the relatively small number of participants within this group. 
 
It is important to note that even if there are differences between sub-groups 
and treatments, this analysis cannot establish causation. Any difference in 
impacts between, say, participants of large versus small contracts is not 
necessarily attributable to contract size per se – it could be that the 
participants served by different sized contracts are different on other 
observable factors, such as age. Or it could be that the support itself varies in 
other ways - for example larger contracts may also be more likely to be run by 
private organisations. All we could say in this instance would be that there 
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might be a relationship between contract size and impacts. Establishing the 
reasons for differences would require further quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. 
4.3.1 Rationale for selected sub-group categories  
In this section, we describe the rationale for evaluating each of our selected 
participant sub-group categories. While there are very specific reasons for 
each category selection, they were broadly motivated by two overarching 
objectives: 
 
1. we are interested in the heterogeneity of the impacts with regard to 
the most pertinent participant characteristics; and 
 
2. by hard-matching on the most pertinent characteristics, we gain a 
counterfactual that is more precise with regard to each 
characteristic of interest, thereby lending more credibility to our 
Conditional Independence Assumption. 
 
The selected categories also allow us to estimate the impact for each of the 
four ESF target groups: over 50s, female, ethnic minorities and disabled 
participants. This provides an unprecedented insight into the effectiveness of 
the programme on some of the groups it is most committed to helping.  
Jobcentre Plus District 
The importance of controlling for local labour market characteristics is strongly 
emphasised in much of the PSM literature (for example Bryson, et al., 
2002).32 Our primary analysis aimed to achieve this control by including three 
sets of geographical variables in the propensity score model: the Government 
Office Region of the individual; the district of the individual; and the individual 
Index of Multiple Deprivation scores of the individual (indicative of 
employment, income, health, education, housing, crime and living 
environment at a local super output area level). 
 
To ensure that our primary model fully controls for local labour market 
characteristics we have also performed our analysis for a number of district 
sub-groups, by hard-matching on the district variable. In this analysis, 
participants can only be matched against non-participants from the same 
district. We have selected six districts from among those with high 
participation numbers, deliberately choosing districts which would provide us 
with a reasonable geographical spread across England. 33 These districts 
constitute about one third of our total participant sample for JSA recipients. In 
Section 4.3.3, we present our findings and compare the weighted mean of 
impacts across these districts with our primary estimate. 
                                                 
32 However, we note that Dolton and Smith (2011) found that conditioning on variables 
relating to local labour markets had little effect on their resulting estimates. 
33 We do not identify the individual districts in this paper for reasons of data protection. 
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Benefit Duration 
As discussed in Section 4.2, DWP benefits data shows that the majority of 
new JSA recipients move away from benefit receipt within a few months even 
without the help of employment programmes such as ESF. It is plausible that 
the extent to which participants need support is related to the duration of their 
current benefit claim. As the ESF fund has been used predominantly for short 
term JSA recipients during the recent recession, it is important to know 
whether this could offer a partial explanation of the low impacts of the 
programme on the JSA group. We have therefore estimated the impacts of 
the programme for participants, by hard-matching on the duration of their most 
recent JSA claim at the time of entering the programme. We consider the 
following groups: 
 
- 0 to 3 months duration; 
- 3 to 6 months duration; 
- 6 to 9 months duration; 
- over 9 months duration; 
Age, disability, ethnicity and gender 
Age, disability, ethnicity and gender are important characteristics of identity in 
the UK. The variables which relate to each of these characteristics in our 
model are therefore likely to be particularly important in determining a 
participant’s probability of participation and their expected employment 
outcomes in the absence of support. Each variable is also indicative of a 
number of unobserved factors which are not directly captured in our model: for 
example, age is likely to be related to life experience and maturity, gender 
may relate to personality and attitudes, ethnicity could be indicative of cultural 
background, while a disability may relate to specific types of qualities and 
challenges which are not experienced in the wider population.  
 
Hard-matching on each of these characteristics allows us to achieve our two 
primary objectives. Firstly, we are able to achieve a more precise 
counterfactual with regard to each pertinent characteristic, for comparison with 
our treatment sub-groups. By comparing the weighted impact across each 
category with our original primary estimate, we can gain confidence in the 
success of our original matching approach in controlling for these pertinent 
characteristics. Secondly, it is important to understand the impacts of ESF 
provision on each of the sub-groups within these categories.  
 
The ESF programme aims to help five specific target groups, which include 
individuals aged over 50, females, ethnic minorities and individuals with a 
disability. Each of these groups is regarded as being at a disadvantage in the 
current UK labour market, indicated for example by low employment rates. 
The fifth ESF target group is lone parents. We were unable to analyse this 
group explicitly owing to the small number of participants who fall into this 
category. 
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We have therefore analysed the programme impact on participants falling into 
the following groups: 
 
Table 4.2: Group categories for age, disability, ethnicity and gender 
 
Age Disability Ethnicity Gender
Under 25 Disabled White Female
25 to 49 Not Disabled Black Male
Over 50 Asian  
 
We note that only three ethnic groups were analysed in this way, as all other 
ethnic groups had too few participants to gain robust results. 
4.3.2 Rationale for selected sub-treatment categories  
In this section, we describe the rationale for evaluating specific groups of 
contracts with regard to their shared characteristics. Broadly speaking we aim 
to uncover the heterogeneity of impacts with regard to two dimensions: 
 
1. the type of support which participants receive; 
2. the incentives which drive providers; 
Sector 
It is likely that the incentives which drive organisations in each of the private, 
public and third sectors are very different. The three sectors are also likely to 
utilise different methods of implementing provision and to have different 
structures in place. In thinking about future policy for employment 
programmes such as ESF, it is therefore important to know the impacts 
achieved by providers from each sector.  
Funding Model and Unit Cost 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the ratio between service fee payments and 
outcome payments varies between contracts. The unit cost to DWP for each 
participant also varies between contracts. It is plausible that the incentives 
provided by different funding arrangements leads to different ways of 
operating among providers.  
 
We have therefore analysed the programme impact of contracts subdivided 
into the treatment types shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Treatment by Unit Cost and Funding Model 
 
By unit cost By service fee: job outcome ratio
Lower Quartile 50:50 contract
Mid Quartiles 60:40 contract
Upper Quartile 30:70 contract  
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Provision Type 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the DWP co-financing body categorises 
contracts into three broad types of provision: 
 
- Tailored (a flexible, personalised approach similar to Flexible New Deal); 
- Targeted (provision specified and aimed at particular support 
requirements); 
- Intermediate Labour Market (ILM); 
 
There are too few participants receiving ILM type provision to gain any 
meaningful impact results, so our sub-treatment analysis focuses only on 
participants treated under either Tailored provision or Targeted provision. By 
estimating the impacts of contracts which fall under each of these categories, 
we can begin to explore the relative effectiveness of the two approaches. This 
is particularly important in a policy environment where future provision looks 
likely to move towards the Tailored type of provision. 
Contract Size 
There is huge variability in the projected number of participants supported 
under each of the 74 DWP ESF contracts. These range from fewer than 100 
participants under the smallest contracts to almost 20,000 participants under 
the largest. It seems highly likely that the methods adopted and the structures 
in place will vary according to the expected number of participants. The size of 
the contract may also be indicative of how well established a provider is. The 
current plans for future employment programmes are to move towards larger 
contracts, so it is particularly important to explore the relative effectiveness of 
large and small contracts on the current programme.    
 
We have therefore analysed the programme impacts of contracts subdivided 
into the following contract sizes: 
 
- Lower quartile (less than 2700 projected participants34); 
- Mid quartiles (2700 to 7500 projected participants); 
- Upper Quartile (more than 7500 projected participants). 
Cohort Period 
Feedback from the DWP CFO suggests that many ESF contracts have taken 
several months to ’get off the ground’, and may therefore have been less 
effective in the early stages of the programme. This idea is loosely supported 
by management information data, which shows that the job entry rate of 
participants has improved over time since the start of the programme. If the 
programme effectiveness is indeed improving over time, then it is possible 
that our primary impact estimates may underestimate the true impact of the 
programme as a whole. To begin to explore whether support in the early and 
                                                 
34 We note that the actual number of participants starting within our cohort period correlates 
strongly with the projected number of participants (R-squared=0.68).  
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later stages of the programme have had different impacts on participants, we 
have analysed the programme impact for participants in each of two narrower 
cohort periods:  
 
- June 2008 to November 2008; and 
- December 2008 to April 2009. 
4.3.3 Results of the Sub-group and Sub-treatment analysis  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the benefit and employment impacts at 26 and 52 
weeks35 for sub groups and sub-treatments. Since the impacts fluctuate to 
varying degrees over time, we have also presented the mean impacts for the 
whole period of 52 weeks and for the period 26 to 52 weeks.36  
 
It is essential to realise that the subgroup estimates are based on a smaller 
number of observations than used in our primary analysis. Consequently the 
impact estimates of the subgroups are less certain and have larger confidence 
intervals than the equivalent estimates described in our primary analysis of 
the entire JSA group, and it becomes more difficult to detect an effect which is 
statistically different from zero or from other groups, should one exist. 
Therefore, the lack of statistical significance should not necessarily be taken 
to mean that there was no impact for a particular subgroup; rather it should be 
viewed indicating that ESF has not had a sufficiently large effect, should one 
exist, for it to be captured statistically.  
 
While all sub-group and sub-treatment impact estimates described in Tables 
4.4 and 4.5 are for JSA customers only, we have included the impacts for the 
primary IB/ESA group at the bottom of each table for reference.  
 
                                                 
35 Indicating statistical significance at the 90% and 95% level compared to zero impact. 
36 We do not calculate statistical significance for these mean impacts. 
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Table 4.4: Sub-group Impacts 
 
Sub-Group
Category
Treatment 
obs (Nt)
Impact at 
26 weeks
Impact at 
52 weeks
Mean          
(0-52wk)
Mean         
(26-52wk)
Impact at 
26 weeks
Impact at 
52 weeks
Mean          
(0-52wk)
Mean         
(26-52wk)
JSA baseline 25,720 0.9 -0.6 0.8 0.1 3.5** 4.5** 3.1 4.1
By Gender
Female 5,200 -0.5 -1.3 -0.3 -1.2 4.1** 5.0** 3.7 4.7
Male 20,530 0.9 -0.6 1.0 0.3 3.5** 4.4** 3.0 4.0
TOTAL 25,720 0.6 -0.7 0.7 0.0 3.6 4.5 3.1 4.1
By Age
Aged <25 5,000 1.9 0.6 1.7 1.2 2.9** 3.2** 2.6 3.2
Aged 25-49 16,050 0.3 -1.0 0.4 -0.4 3.8** 4.7** 3.3 4.3
Aged 50+ 4,680 1.1 -0.4 0.7 0.0 3.9** 5.5** 3.5 4.8
TOTAL 25,720 0.8 -0.6 0.7 0.0 3.6 4.6 3.2 4.2
By Disability
Disabled 7,230 1.6 -0.3 1.2 0.7 3.1** 4.2** 2.8 3.6
Not Disabled 18,060 -0.1 -1.4* 0.1 -0.8 3.8** 4.7** 3.3 4.4
TOTAL 25,300 0.4 -1.1 0.4 -0.4 3.6 4.6 3.2 4.2
By Ethnicity
White 19,050 0.0 -1.5** -0.2 -0.9 3.7** 4.6** 3.3 4.3
Black 1,820 1.5 -1.3 1.5 0.4 3.3 6.5** 3.8 5.1
Asian 1,480 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.0 2.7 3.5 2.7 3.4
TOTAL 22,340 0.4 -1.1 0.2 -0.5 3.6 4.7 3.3 4.3
By benefit duration
0-3 months 11,920 -0.4 -1.9* 0.0 -1.0 3.9** 5.1** 3.3 4.5
3-6 months 6,980 0.4 -0.7 0.2 -0.6 4.0** 4.5** 3.6 4.5
6-9 months 3,540 0.6 -1.0 0.3 -0.4 2.5 4.1** 2.3 3.3
Over 9 months 3,290 0.1 -0.4 0.3 -0.1 3.1* 3.7** 2.7 3.5
TOTAL 25,720 0.0 -1.3 0.1 -0.7 3.6 4.6 3.2 4.2
By District
District 1 2,000 2.0 0.7 2.7 2.7 0.1 2.9 1.4 1.7
District 2 1,000 2.7 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 2.8 2.7 2.9
District 3 1,000 -2.8 -1.0 -1.5 -1.8 5.1* 6.1** 3.7 5.5
District 4 2,000 0.9 -2.4 -0.3 -1.0 2.6 3.4 1.9 3.3
District 5 1,000 2.3 0.3 2.6 1.9 3.1 3.9 2.5 3.6
District 6 1,000 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 3.8 4.0 2.9 3.8
TOTAL 9,000 0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.7 2.4 3.3 2.0 2.9
IB Baseline 1,970 -8.5** -8.9** -7.4 -9.5 9.8** 11.2** 9.2 11.1
All Benefit Impact Employment Impact
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
 
All participant observations are rounded to the nearest ten, except for those associated 
with specific districts which are rounded to the nearest thousand for data protection 
reasons. 
 
For impacts at 26 weeks and 52 weeks: 
*    significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level; 
**   significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 4.5: Sub-treatment Impacts 
 
Sub-Treatment
Category
Treatment 
obs (Nt)
Impact at 
26 weeks
Impact at 
52 weeks
Mean          
(0-52wk)
Mean         
(26-52wk)
Impact at 
26 weeks
Impact at 
52 weeks
Mean          
(0-52wk)
Mean         
(26-52wk)
JSA baseline 25,720 0.9 -0.6 0.8 0.1 3.5** 4.5** 3.1 4.1
By Sector
Private sector 17,640 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -0.4 3.5** 4.2** 3 4
Public sector 3,130 1 -2.2 0.2 -0.8 3.8** 4.9** 3.3 4.6
Third Sector 4,880 1.6 -0.2 1.9 0.8 3.4** 4.9** 3 4
TOTAL 25,650 0.6 -0.9 0.5 -0.2 3.5 4.4 3.0 4.1
By Funding model
50:50 contract 22,320 0.8 -0.5 0.8 0 3.7** 4.6** 3.3 4.3
60:40 contract 2,610 1.5 -0.7 2 1.6 0 1.2 0.6 1
30:70 contract 790 1 -5.9* -2.8 -5 6.5* 8.0** 5.1 6.8
TOTAL 25,720 0.9 -0.7 0.8 0.0 3.4 4.4 3.1 4.0
By Cohort period
Jun 08 to Nov 08 cohort 10,120 1 -0.4 0.6 0.3 2.4** 3.6** 2.4 3
Dec 08 to Apr 09 cohort 15,610 0.3 -0.7 0.7 -0.4 4.5** 5.1** 3.7 5
TOTAL 25,720 0.6 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 3.7 4.5 3.2 4.2
By provision type
Tailored 21,080 1.2* -0.3 1 0.3 3.1** 4.2** 2.8 3.8
Targeted 4,560 -2.4* -3.4** -1.6 -2.8 5.6** 5.9** 4.6 5.8
TOTAL 25,640 0.6 -0.9 0.5 -0.3 3.5 4.5 3.1 4.2
By unit cost
Lower Quartile 6,550 1.7 0.2 1.4 0.8 2.2* 3.8** 2.3 3.3
Mid Quartiles 12,560 1.7 0 1.6 1.1 3.2** 4.0** 2.8 3.7
Upper Quartile 6,600 -1.7 -3.1** -1.7 -3 5.3** 5.7** 4.5 5.5
TOTAL 25,710 0.8 -0.7 0.7 0.0 3.5 4.4 3.1 4.1
By Contract Size
Large Contracts 6,110 1.8 -0.1 1.9 1.1 2.2* 3.6* 1.9 2.9
Medium Contracts 13,010 0.2 -1.2 0.3 -0.5 3.5** 4.0** 3 3.8
Small Contracts 6,600 0.5 -1 -0.1 -0.9 4.4** 5.8** 4.2 5.4
TOTAL 25,720 0.7 -0.9 0.6 -0.2 3.4 4.4 3.0 4.0
IB Baseline 1,970 -8.5** -8.9** -7.4 -9.5 9.8** 11.2** 9.2 11.1
All Benefit Impact Employment Impact
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
 
All participant observations are rounded to the nearest ten. 
 
For impacts at 26 weeks and 52 weeks: 
*    significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level; 
**   significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
Overall, by far the largest difference in impacts is between the IB/ESA and 
JSA customer groups already described in our primary estimates. Within the 
JSA customer group there appears to be relatively little variation in impacts 
according to the characteristics of participants or the type of support; however, 
as we have discussed, the subgroup size is often too small to detect 
differences from zero, particularly for benefit impacts. Nonetheless, our 
findings suggest that on the whole, the impacts on the JSA treatment group 
are reasonably homogeneous across the sub-groups and sub-treatments that 
we have described.  
 
In addition to understanding the heterogeneity of impacts across our sub-
groups and sub-treatments, this analysis also enables us to gain more 
confidence in our original primary estimates. As already noted, by hard-
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matching on the most pertinent participant characteristics, we gain a more 
precise counterfactual with regard to those characteristics, which thereby 
lends more credibility to our Conditional Independence Assumption. We have 
estimated the weighted impacts across each of the sub-groups and sub-
treatments, as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  
 
The overall impact estimates gained when hard-matching within each sub-
group or by investigating the impacts of each sub-treatment category are 
broadly similar to our primary JSA estimates (all mean benefit impacts over 
the full 52 weeks lie between 0 and +1.5 percentage points; all mean 
employment impacts over the same period lie between +2 percentage points 
and +3.5 percentage points). This provides additional assurance that our 
initial approach to including these pertinent variables in our Propensity Score 
Matching resulted in a suitable counterfactual, and therefore that our primary 
estimates are robust. 
 
Notwithstanding these two prime conclusions, some small differences appear 
to be emerging within the sub-group and sub-treatment categories, which we 
describe below. We note, however, that we cannot ascribe statistical 
significance37 or causal explanations to these differences; this would require 
further investigation as more data becomes available.  
 
By sub-group: 
 
- Impacts are slightly better for women than men; 
 
- Impacts are slightly better for participants aged 25 or over than participants 
aged under 25; 
 
- Impacts are slightly better for participants who do not have a disability or 
health condition than participants who do have a disability or health 
condition; 
 
- Impacts are slightly better for participants from white or black ethnic 
minority backgrounds than participants from an Asian ethnic minority 
background; and 
 
- There is little difference in impacts between long and short term benefit 
recipients. This suggests that the reason for the poor impacts of the JSA 
group cannot be explained by the high number of short term JSA 
claimants flowing onto the programme from the recession.  
 
By sub-treatment: 
 
- There is little difference in impacts between public, private and third sector 
provision; 
 
                                                 
37 As described in Footnote 30, this may be in part due to an overly cautious approach to 
calculating errors. 
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- Contracts with higher job outcome funding models are delivering better 
impacts than those with lower job outcome funding; although the subgroup 
is small, the 30:70 funding model shows particularly good benefit (-6 
percentage points) and employment impacts (+8 percentage points) at 52 
weeks. This suggests that the incentive offered for higher job outcome 
payments may be working for these contracts; 
 
- Impacts are slightly better for participants from the later cohort period than 
the earlier cohort period; 
 
- Targeted contracts are delivering slightly better impacts than tailored 
contracts. This suggests that contracts categorised to be more ‘black box’ 
in design may be having less impact than contracts focused on specific 
types of participant support;  
 
- Contracts with higher unit costs are delivering slightly better impacts than 
those with lower unit costs; and 
 
- Smaller contracts are delivering slightly better impacts than larger 
contracts. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the impacts of employment provision financed by the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and provided through the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) on the labour market outcomes of unemployed and 
economically inactive participants in England. The analysis relied on a 
comprehensive individual database derived from administrative data sources. 
A Propensity Score Matching methodology was used to determine the labour 
market outcomes of participants and matched non-participants over a 52 
week period following participation.  
 
The main findings are: 
 
- For Jobseeker’s Allowance customers (67% of DWP ESF participants) 
the impacts of the programme are low. There is an increase in benefit 
receipt of up to 3 percentage points among participants over the first four 
months following programme entry, most likely due to reduced job-search 
activity while participating on the programme (commonly known as lock-in 
effect). In the following eight months there is almost no difference in the 
rate of benefit receipt between participants and non-participants. There is 
a small increase in employment rate among participants, which reaches 
4.5 percentage points one year after programme entry.  
 
- For Incapacity Benefit and Employment Support Allowance customers 
(6% of DWP ESF participants) the impacts of the programme are higher. 
There is a reduction in the rate of benefit receipt of 9 percentage points 
and an increase in employment rate of 11 percentage points among 
participants one year after programme entry. 
 
In summary, ESF provision has low impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance 
customers, but is far more effective for Incapacity Benefit and Employment 
Support Allowance customers over the 52 weeks following participation. 
 
In Section 4.2 we discussed a number of possible explanations for our 
findings, which we briefly outline below: 
 
- The voluntary nature of ESF provision means that ESF participants are 
likely to be more ‘work-ready’ than non-participants. This is particularly the 
case among JSA customers who tend to be less disadvantaged and closer 
to the labour market than IB/ESA customers. It is therefore likely that many 
JSA customers participating on ESF could have achieved jobs without the 
additional support provided by ESF; 
 
- Incapacity Benefit customers (who make up the majority of the IB/ESA 
participant group) have a lower base-level of employment support and 
tend to be further away from the labour market than JSA customers. This 
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could explain why impacts the of ESF provision are larger for the IB/ESA 
group than the JSA group; 
 
- JSA customers tend to move away from benefit receipt quickly even 
without additional support. The short-term impacts for this group are 
negative, possibly because time spent on the programme leads to a 
reduction in job search activity (lock-in effect); 
 
- There may be softer outcomes of the programme, such as increased skills, 
which would not necessarily be observed in our current short term impact 
measures, but may improve labour market prospects in the long term. 
 
The sub-group and sub-treatment analysis of JSA recipients, discussed in 
section 4.3, suggests that the impacts of ESF are fairly homogeneous across 
the broad range of participant characteristics, and across the range of support 
offered by ESF providers. We describe some emerging observations in 
section 4.3.3. However, further investigation would be required before 
statistical significance can be ascribed to these findings.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the scope of our analysis lies in estimating 
net impacts of DWP ESF employment provision on the benefit receipt and 
employment rate of participants. The programme may have a number of other 
benefits to its participants and to society as a whole which are not captured in 
our outcome measures. For example, participants may gain skills and 
confidence which move them a step closer to the labour market, without 
resulting in a change in labour market status. Or indeed, participants may 
attain higher paying or otherwise more desirable jobs than they would have 
achieved without ESF help. While the present analysis makes no attempt to 
directly capture such outcomes, some of these effects may influence our 
outcome measures in the longer term through their indirect influence on the 
benefit receipt and employment rate of participants. These may therefore be 
captured in any future studies investigating the longer term impacts of ESF 
support.  
 
Finally, we outline below a number of possibilities for future research which 
would further our understanding of the effectiveness of ESF provision: 
 
- further sub-group and sub-treatment analysis to see if any statistically 
significant differences emerge as more data becomes available; 
 
- longer term impact estimates for the JSA and IB/ESA customer groups; 
 
- impact analysis of participants entering the programme across the entire 
programme period; 
 
- impact analysis of ESF for the other main client group (Income Support 
customers); 
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- impact analysis of Skills Funding Agency ESF funded adult employment 
provision. 
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Appendix 1 - Controlling for Labour Market History 
As discussed in section 3.1, the labour market history of an individual provides 
an important proxy for unobserved characteristics, such as motivation to work, 
which will jointly influence both the participation decision and the outcomes in 
the absence of participation. It is therefore important to control for benefit and 
employment history in our propensity score model.  
 
A common method described in the literature for controlling for labour market 
history is the approach adopted by Card and Sullivan (1988), in which a single 
variable is constructed to describe the labour market position of each 
individual over time. In the early stages of our analysis, we explored the 
effectiveness of this approach in balancing our JSA participant and non-
participant samples with regard to benefit and employment history. We 
constructed two labour market history strings for each individual to represent a 
timeline of their benefit and employment histories in the two years before 
entering the programme.  
 
This approach has the advantage that a single variable can indicate not just 
the length of time an individual has spent receiving benefit or in employment, 
but also represents a timeline of moving in and out of each labour market 
state. However, we found that our implementation of this method did not 
enable us to satisfactorily control for labour market history in the few months 
leading up to programme entry. We describe the reasons for this below, 
before outlining an alternative method which we developed and used 
throughout our analysis. 
 
In the approach utilised by Card and Sullivan, the number of permutations of 
the constructed string variable is 2N, where N is the number of time periods 
independently represented in the history string. Therefore, each additional 
time period included in the string doubles the number of possible 
permutations. In our implementation of the Card and Sullivan approach, we 
divided the labour market history into eight periods of three months. This 
allowed us to include two years of labour market history, with only 256 
possible permutations. For example, the benefit string ‘11110000’ would 
indicate that an individual was receiving benefit for the first year (four periods 
of three months) and was not receiving benefit for the second year of the two 
year period before entering the programme. We considered an individual to be 
receiving benefit in a period if they were receiving benefit for more than half of 
the three month period.  
 
We found that our implementation of the approach adopted by Card and 
Sullivan was limited by the large time periods represented by each binary 
indicator in the string (in our case three months). The method therefore failed 
to control for labour market history over sufficiently small periods of time, 
which was particularly apparent in the six month period immediately prior to 
the start of ESF provision, where differences between participants and non-
participants are greatest. This is shown below in Figure 5.1. 
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We have therefore devised and implemented an alternative approach to 
control for labour market history, which is adapted to control for differences 
over smaller time periods. We generate 104 independent binary variables 
which represent an individual’s benefit receipt or non-receipt in each of the 
104 weeks prior to ESF start. We then generate a further 104 independent 
binary variables which represent whether an individual is in or out of 
employment in each of the 104 weeks prior to ESF start. Our probit model 
controls for labour market history using the resulting 208 binary variables. 
 
We found that using this ‘weekly outcomes’ approach to control for labour 
market history resulted in a much tighter match with regard to benefit receipt 
between the two groups over the pre-programme period. Figure 5.1 below 
shows the percentage point difference between the proportion of the final 
matched treatment and comparison groups receiving JSA in each pre-
programme week using both our implementation of the methodology adopted 
by Card and Sullivan and our alternative approach.  
 
Figure 5.1: Comparing two alternative controls for labour market history   
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As shown, our alternative model constructs a comparison group which is more 
consistently matched with regard to the entire two years of benefit history. In 
our ‘weekly outcomes’ model, the percentage point difference between the 
treatment and comparison groups is approximately -1 percentage point in the 
period between 104 and 26 weeks prior to starting the ESF programme. In the 
26 weeks immediately before the programme start, this difference reduces to 
less than half a percentage point. We conclude that, at least for the purposes 
of this ESF evaluation, our weekly history matching approach produces 
overall a more tightly matched comparison group with regard to benefit history 
than our implementation of the Card and Sullivan approach. We have 
therefore used this method throughout our analysis.  
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Appendix 2 – Generating Pseudo Start Dates 
The benefit and employment outcomes of individual participants in our 
treatment group are measured weekly from the date on which they start 
provision. However, because participation is voluntary and can occur at any 
time during an individual’s claim, those in our comparison group have no 
natural start date from which outcomes can be measured. It is therefore 
necessary to assign a ‘pseudo start date’ to each non-participant so that a 
time-based comparison between groups can be made. We must ensure that 
these pseudo start dates identify a period of time over which non-participants 
can best represent what would have happened to ESF participants if they had 
not participated in the programme. 
 
The method used for generating pseudo starts is based on the technique 
described in the evaluation of New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) (Orr et 
al, 2007). It aims to align the non-participants and participants with respect to 
two time dimensions: calendar time and length of time on benefit. 
 
The method used for generating pseudo start dates is as follows: 
 
1. All participant records were separated according to the benefit start 
month of the participant – i.e. separate data sets were created for 
participants starting benefit in June 2007 38, July 2007, Aug 2007, and 
so on up to the latest ESF start month included in the analysis; 
 
2. For each of these participant data sets, we calculated the proportion of 
ESF starts occurring in each possible ESF start month. For example, 
for participants with a benefit start month of September 2007 (Table 5.1 
is representative only): 
 
Table 5.1: Illustrative example of the proportion and cumulative 
proportion of participants starting ESF provision by month 
 
ESF start month % of ESF starts Cumulative % 
June 2008 1.2 1.2 
July 2008 7.3 8.4 
Aug 2008 6.1 14.5 
. . . 
. . . 
April 200939 9.4 100 
 
                                                 
38 Note that records with benefit start dates prior to June 2007 were kept together as a single 
file. This was because it was assumed that the decision of when to begin ESF participation 
would not depend on benefit start month for those who had been on benefit for such a long 
period. 
39 April 2009 was the latest month from which 52 weeks worth of outcome data were 
available. Participants who started after this date were not included in our analysis. 
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3. We then separated all non-participant records according to the benefit 
start month of the non-participant, in the same manner as carried out in 
Step 1 for participants; 
 
4. For each non-participant benefit start month file, we randomly assigned 
a pseudo start month from the distribution of ESF start months gained 
from the participant file with the equivalent benefit start month.  
 
E.g. for participants with a benefit start month of June 2007 (again, 
figures are representative only): 
 
Table 5.2: Illustrative example of the assignment of pseudo start 
dates to non-participants by month 
 
ESF start month % of ESF starts % of pseudo 
starts 
June 2008 1.2 1.2 
July 2008 7.3 7.3 
Aug 2008 6.1 6.2 
. . . 
. . . 
April 2009 9.3 9.4 
 
5. We then assigned a random date in the assigned month from a flat 
distribution (i.e. all dates within the month were equally likely). 
 
6. If an assigned pseudo start date occurred at a time when the non-
participant was not claiming their primary benefit (JSA or IB/ESA), then 
the pseudo start was considered ‘invalid’ and the record was removed 
from the sample. 
 
In Appendix 6 we additionally describe a sensitivity test performed in our 
model development stage to test the sensitivity of our impact estimates to the 
method of generating pseudo start dates. 
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Appendix 3 – Matching Protocol 
We describe below the matching protocol used in this evaluation to construct 
suitable treatment and comparison groups from our participant and non-
participant samples. 
 
1. Define a participant (treatment) sample within the analysis cohort 
period, as specified in Section 2.1.1; 
2. Define a non-participant (comparison) sample within the same cohort 
period, as specified in Section 2.1.2; 
3. Combine the records from steps 1 and 2 to produce a single sample 
comprising treatment and comparison records; 
4. Code an indicator variable Z, which is 1 for treatment records and 0 for 
comparison records; 
5. Specify and estimate a binary probit for p(x) := P(Z=1 | X=x); 
6. Restrict the sample to common support: remove all treatment records 
for which no comparison record falls within the Kernel bandwidth (a 
bandwidth of 0.0001 was used in our primary analysis);  
7. Implement a Kernel ‘one-to-many’ matching approach: 
a. Select a treatment record and identify all comparison records 
with propensity scores lying within the Kernel bandwidth of the 
treatment record score; 
b. Apply a weighting to the comparison records using an 
Epanechnikov distribution such that those with closer propensity 
scores to the treatment record are weighted higher than those 
with more distant propensity scores; 
c. Repeat steps a and b until all treatment records have been 
selected. The weighting applied to comparison records for each 
repeated step is added to the cumulative weighting from all 
previous steps (the total weighting of all comparison records is 
therefore equal to the number of treatment records). 
8. Use the final weights for each comparison record to calculate a 
weighted mean for each outcome variable in Z=0; 
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Appendix 4 - Propensity Score Distribution for primary 
IB and ESA group: 
The propensity score distribution for our IB and ESA primary estimate is 
shown in Figure 5.2 below; each point is the cumulative proportion of the 
group with propensity scores in increments of 0.001.  
 
Figure 5.2: Primary IB/ESA Analysis Propensity Score Distribution: 
(1,970 treatment records; 406,430 comparison records) 
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The graph shows that propensity scores tend to be higher for participants, 
although the mean score for both groups is low. The mean propensity score is 
0.005 (proportion of records receiving ESF support); 28% of non-participants 
have a score of more than the mean compared with 77% of participants; also 
3% of the non-participants have scores more than 0.025 compared to 31% of 
participants. The small proportion of participants for whom no common 
support is available are those with the highest propensity scores.  
 
We find that our propensity score distribution for IB/ESA recipients provides 
sufficient overlap between participants and non-participants, with almost 99% 
of participants finding common support. 
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Appendix 5 - Mutually exclusive outcomes and 
impacts  
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, our primary estimates for the JSA group show 
that both the benefit and employment impact estimates are positive for the 
first 15 weeks following participation. This suggests that ESF participation 
increases an individual’s chances of both claiming benefit and being in 
employment. As noted, this result does not present a contradiction because 
the impacts we consider are not mutually exclusive and do not account for all 
possible outcomes.  
 
To illustrate this point, Table 5.3 below shows the impacts of ESF support on 
JSA customers with regard to four mutually exclusive labour market 
outcomes:  
 
- Benefit only - receiving benefit and not in employment;  
- Work only - in employment and not receiving benefit; 
- Neither - neither in employment nor receiving benefits.  
- Both - both in employment and receiving benefit. 
 
Table 5.3: Impacts (percentage points) on mutually exclusive outcomes 
at 26 weeks for JSA customers 
 
Benefit only Work only Neither Both
-0.3 2.3 -3.2 1.2  
 
It can be seen from Table 5.3 that the arithmetic sum of all mutually exclusive 
impacts is zero. The negative impacts of the programme on receiving benefit 
only and neither in employment nor receiving benefit precisely balance the 
positive impacts on employment and both receiving benefit and in 
employment. The impacts we describe throughout the rest of this paper are 
not mutually exclusive, so the impact on benefit receipt is the arithmetic sum 
of the impact on ‘benefit only’ and on ‘both’, while the impact on work is the 
arithmetic sum of the impact on ‘work only’ and on ‘both’. 
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Appendix 6 - Sensitivity to methods 
As discussed in Section 3.4, during the development stages of our model we 
explored the sensitivity of our impact estimates to the precise implementation 
of the PSM methodology. These sensitivity tests helped to inform our 
decisions in producing a final preferred methodology, which we then used in 
our primary estimates, sub-group and sub-treatment analyses. We performed 
the following sensitivity tests on subsets of the JSA group. 
 
- sensitivity to time-based variables; 
- sensitivity to alternative pseudo start generation methods; 
- sensitivity to the Kernel bandwidth; 
- sensitivity to alternative methods of cleaning the HMRC employment data; 
Sensitivity to time-based variables 
As discussed in Appendix 2, for our comparison group to represent a suitable 
counterfactual we need to ensure that ESF participants and non-participants 
are aligned in time (both calendar time and length of time on benefit). Our 
pseudo start generation method provides us with a comparison sample whose 
starts distribution is similar to that of the treatment group. However, we still 
need to ensure that our inclusion of time-based variables in the propensity 
score model produces a final comparison group which is aligned in time with 
the treatment group.  
 
To this end our primary analysis uses two time-based variables: benefit start 
month and ESF/pseudo start month.  
 
To investigate whether our impact estimates were sensitive to the choice of 
time-based variables, we performed exploratory analysis using the following 
alternative variable sets in our probit model: 
 
1. ESF/pseudo start month only; 
2. ESF/pseudo start month, benefit start month and benefit duration at 
start date; 
3. ESF/pseudo start month and benefit duration at start date. 
 
We found that altering the time-based variables used in the PSM made very 
little difference to the final impact measure. We therefore conclude that our 
impact estimates are not strongly dependent on the exact method of 
incorporating time-based variables into the probit model. 
Sensitivity to the method of generating pseudo starts 
We carried out two sensitivity tests on the method with which pseudo starts 
were generated to address two key analytical questions: 
 
 59
1. Do our impact estimates depend on the random allocation of pseudo 
starts from the actual starts distribution – i.e. if we had used a different 
series of random numbers in the assignment, would we have achieved 
a different result? 
 
2. Does it matter if the distribution of pseudo starts for the comparison 
group differs from the distribution of actual starts in the treatment 
group? 
 
To address the first question, we simply used a different random seed to 
generate pseudo start dates. This resulted in each record being assigned an 
alternative pseudo start date, and consequently different non-participants 
being retained in the sample once we had removed those with ‘invalid’ pseudo 
start dates (dates on which the non-participant was not receiving their primary 
benefit).  
 
The use of an alternative random seed produced no change to our impact 
estimates. 
 
To address the second question, we used a flat distribution to randomly 
assign pseudo start dates to non-participants. Each non-participant in the 
comparison sample was therefore equally likely to receive a pseudo start date 
in any of the start months, regardless of their duration on benefit. We then 
used time based variables in the propensity score model, as in our primary 
analysis: ESF (pseudo) start month and benefit start month. 
 
Using a flat distribution to generate pseudo starts produced no change to our 
impact estimates. We conclude that the precise method of generating pseudo 
starts makes no difference to the impact estimate, provided that:  
 
- there are enough non-participants who align with participants on the 
dimensions of ESF/pseudo start date and benefit duration; 
 
- we include ESF/pseudo start date and benefit duration on time based 
variables when performing the PSM. 
Sensitivity to the Kernel bandwidth  
The bandwidth used in the Kernel matching determines how closely the 
propensity score of a non-participant must be to that of a participant in order 
for the non-participant to be selected as a match for the participant. The 
bandwidth used in our primary analysis was 0.0001. Thus a participant will be 
matched with any non-participants who have a propensity score within +/- 
0.0001. The closer the non-participant score is to the participant score, the 
higher it will be weighted in the final matched comparison group.  
 
If the bandwidth is increased, it means that each participant will match with 
more non-participants. This has the advantage that it can increase common 
support for participants with extreme propensity scores, but has the 
disadvantage that we are giving greater weight to non-participants who are 
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less precisely matched. Conversely, if the bandwidth is decreased, it means 
that participants will more tightly match to non-participants. This has the 
advantage of ensuring a more closely matched comparison group, but the 
disadvantage that we may not find matches for some participants – a lack of 
common support. Effectively the choice of bandwidth represents a trade-off 
between tightness of the matching and level of common support. 
 
In our model development stage, we investigated the effect of varying the 
bandwidth on both the impact estimates and the level of common support for 
a sub-sample of our JSA primary sample. The bandwidths investigated were 
0.0001, 0.00001 and 0.000001. We found that using a smaller bandwidth had 
the effect of reducing the level of common support (down to 83% for a 
bandwidth of 0.000001 from 98% for our primary analysis bandwidth of 
0.0001) but no substantial effect on the impact estimates (all three estimates 
were within 1.5 percentage points of one another for JSA, benefit and 
employment impacts at a time 34 weeks after the start of participation). 
 
We conclude that our impact measure is sufficiently insensitive to changes in 
the bandwidth used. 
Sensitivity to the method of cleaning employment data 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, a large proportion of employment spells on the 
data set provided by HMRC have missing start or end dates. Our primary 
estimates were achieved after a process of randomising the missing start and 
end dates across the tax year in which they were known to occur. While we do 
not expect any systematic bias to result from this process, we note that this 
leads to a large proportion of individuals (up to 30%) being identified as both 
‘receiving benefit’ and ‘in work’ in the same week. To provide additional 
assurance that our employment impact estimates were not biased by our 
randomisation process, during our model development stage we tested the 
sensitivity of our impact estimates to an alternative method of randomisation 
for the JSA group.  
 
The alternative approach makes two main assumptions: 
 
1. that the DWP benefits data is correct; 
2. that an individual cannot be simultaneously in employment and 
receiving JSA. 
 
The first step of this approach is, as previously, to randomise missing start 
and end dates across the tax year in which they were known to occur. We 
then adjust the randomised dates such that they do not fall within a known 
JSA spell of the individual, as described below: 
 
- If a JSA spell overlaps with the employment end date, we assign a new 
employment end date equal to the JSA start date; 
 
- If a JSA spell overlaps with the employment start date, we assign a new 
employment start date equal to the JSA end date; 
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- If a JSA spell fully encloses the employment spell, the employment spell is 
assumed to be incorrect and is removed; 
 
We found that, while using this alternative method of cleaning the employment 
data led to lower proportions of individuals in both the treatment and 
comparison groups being identified as in employment for any given week, the 
impact on employment was similar for both methods (to within 0.5 percentage 
points). 
  
We therefore conclude that the method with which the employment data was 
cleaned does not appear to systematically bias our impact estimates. 
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This paper describes findings from an evaluation of the net impacts of the 2007-13 European 
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Work and Pensions (DWP) ESF funded employment provision part of the programme. In this 
paper, we estimate the impacts of ESF support on participants who entered the programme 
between June 2008 and April 2009. We provide separate impact estimates for two broad 
DWP customer groups: participants in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and participants in 
receipt of Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance. 
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